


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23 SEPTEMBER 1992



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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

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PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-035

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23 September 1992

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NIGERIA

Official on Joining Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

AB1709101092 Niamey Voix du Sahel Network
in French 1200 GMT 11 Sep 92

[Text] As you know, Niger joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NTT] on 4 September. In order to have more information on this issue, Moussa Amani met with the minister of mines, energy, and handicraft, Mahamoudou Ouhoumoudou, this morning. First, he gave the reasons why our country has now joined a treaty which has been in force since March 1970.

[Begin recording] [Ouhoumoudou] Indeed, we have just joined this treaty. The main reason for the delay was lack of sufficient information because at the beginning we thought that joining this treaty would constitute a sort of impediment to the commercialization of Niger's uranium but we have now realized that this is not the case. This is not the case because almost all the countries in the world have joined this treaty, and as far as producer countries are concerned, only South Africa has not joined this treaty. All the countries to which Niger exports its uranium have already joined this treaty, and Niger does not export a completely finished product that can be subjected to strict restrictions. In any case, we have always imposed on our partners most of the conditions that the treaty imposes on uranium purchasing countries. We demand that countries that buy our uranium fulfill certain security conditions in conformity with the norms that have been defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

[Amani] Our attention has been drawn in particular to one of the obligations of signatory states of the treaty. According to this obligation, each member state is committed not to supply fissile matter to states that have no nuclear weapons. This can have bad consequences on the sale of our uranium for which we are looking for new markets, in accordance with the demands of the sovereign national conference.

[Ouhoumoudou] I think we must go back to the idea behind NTT. Indeed, what is its purpose? Its purpose is to prevent a frantic race for nuclear weapons by the whole of humanity. Uranium is a combustible and we must seek, increasingly, to use it as such. We must not seek to make it a product that would be strictly used for creating destructive weapons. That is what people are seeking to guarantee at the world level: To stop the current creation of a number of atomic bombs and to delay research programs by countries that do not have this nuclear weapon, in the interest of world peace. Moreover, we must know that the quantity of uranium used for military ends is very low in comparison with the quantity of uranium used for industrial purposes, namely the production of electric energy. Niger must therefore gear its effort toward the supply of uranium energy to countries that produce electric energy from nuclear power stations.

[Amani] But, if we examine this measure more level headedly, Niger cannot sell its uranium to whoever it likes.

[Ouhoumoudou] Niger can sell its uranium to whoever it likes: First, to all the countries that signed the treaty. NTT now comprises almost all countries in the world. Niger can sell its uranium. Even out of the countries that have not joined the treaty, only five have atomic research programs, and if these five countries give the guarantee that Niger's uranium will not be used for military ends and that the security norms of the IAEA will be respected, Niger cannot be prevented from selling them its uranium.

[Amani] So, if we have understood you well, Mr. Minister, this obligation is not undermining Niger's sovereignty, because this is a matter of the exploitation of a given national resource.

[Ouhoumoudou] What we must say is that it is not undermining Niger's sovereignty as an individual country, so to speak. There are a number of countries in the world which have realized that the frantic race for the use of atomic energy for military purposes is a very serious risk for humanity. All these countries have decided to restrict their sovereignty, meaning all countries in the world. All countries which joined this treaty have sovereignly decided to restrict their sovereignty to avoid continuing this frantic race for the atomic weapon, and so if there is restriction of sovereignty, it is not specific to Niger. It is a general restriction facing all countries in the world, all peaceloving countries in this world.

[Amani] We feel that this convention protects the already existing nuclear powers. We feel that is the situation inasmuch as these powers do not want those who are not yet in possession of nuclear power to possess it.

[Ouhoumoudou] You are aware that these powers are also negotiating among themselves for nuclear weapon reduction and destruction. It is very possible that in a few years hence, nuclear weapons will disappear or at least be limited to the strict minimum.

[Amani] So, the signing of this convention by Niger stresses the intention of the Niger Government to consolidate world peace.

[Ouhoumoudou] Absolutely. Niger's membership is in this regard. To enlighten you further, when Niger was not a member of this treaty, people were wondering what this country's intention was because this treaty dates back to 1970 and since then almost all uranium producing countries have joined the treaty except Niger. Niger does have a specific number of partners who have all joined the treaty. People were therefore wondering why Niger had not joined it. As I said, it was due to lack of information. People thought it would be an impediment to the commercialization of Niger's uranium but that is not the case.

We have signed contracts with a number of countries. We will continue to honor our contracts with those countries and continue to look for new markets in other countries, provided they give the guarantee that our uranium will not be used for military ends.

I have also said that what we produce is an intermediary product. It is not a finished product so we are under less constraint under this treaty than other countries which produce pure uranium. [end recording]

Government Pledges No Proliferation of N-Weapons

*OW2209161192 Beijing XINHUA in English
1552 GMT 22 Sep 92*

[Text] Vienna, September 22 (XINHUA)—China pledged today that it would not engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The statement came from the country's nuclear industry minister, Jiang Xinxiong, at the 36th regular session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

He said that in its nuclear exports, China maintained the principles that "the importer assures its exclusive use for peaceful purposes," and "does not transfer the item to any third party without the consent of China."

Jiang, who heads the Chinese delegation to the conference, said "in its imports, China undertakes that these will be used solely for peaceful purposes."

"The fundamental objective of China's development of nuclear power is solely for the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the benefit of the people," Jiang added.

He also pointed out that some countries, while adopting measures preventing nuclear proliferation, should not hinder or restrict the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nor jeopardize the legitimate rights of all countries, the developing countries in particular, to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

He pointed out that nuclear energy, as the best alternative source, is both conducive to environmental protection and is highly competitive in its economic efficiency.

Therefore, the minister urged the international organization to concentrate more attention on how to fulfil the nuclear energy requirements of member states.

He said China paid great attention to nuclear safety and was in favor of drafting an international nuclear safety convention.

More than 100 countries are taking part in the session which opened here on Monday and is to end on Friday.

Government Opposes U.S. F-16 Sale to Taiwan

Will Abstain From Arms Talks

*HK2109095492 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese 21 Sep 92 p 6*

[Article by Si Chu (2448 2806): "U.S. Sale of F-16 Fighter Planes to Taiwan and the Five-Nation Arms Control Conference"]

[Text] The U.S. Government decided to sell 150 F-16 fighter planes to China's Taiwan Province on 2 September, disregarding the strong opposition of the Chinese Government. This act of open violation of the Sino-U.S. "17 August Communiqué," wanton interference into China's domestic affairs, and serious damage to the great cause of China's peaceful reunification provoked the strong anger of the Chinese people. On orders from the Chinese Government, Deputy Minister Liu Huaqiu of the Foreign Ministry lodged the strongest possible protest with the U.S. Government on this matter and pointed out that if the United States insists on acting willfully, then the Chinese Government and people will respond correspondingly. At the same time, he announced that until the United States reverses its decision on the sale of the fighter planes to Taiwan, it will be hard for China to take part in the five-nation arms control talks to be attended by China, Russia, the United States, Britain, and France.

What is the five-nation arms control conference? How is China's absence from the conference related to the U.S. sale of fighter planes to Taiwan?

U.S. President George Bush presented a proposal for arms control in the Middle East on 29 May last year, and suggested that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—namely China, Russia, the United States, Britain, and France—hold a consultation on the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the transfer of conventional weapons. Three rounds of meetings were subsequently held following an agreement reached by the five countries: The first session was held in Paris on July 1991, where a document entitled: "Five-Nation Meeting on the Transfer of Weapons and the Prevention of Proliferation" was adopted; the London conference was held in October that same year, where the "Conference Communiqué" and "Rules on the Transfer of Conventional Weapons" were adopted; the Washington conference was held in May this year, where the "Provisional Rules on the Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" was adopted. The documents and agenda of the conferences concerned not only arms control in the Middle East, but also dealt with the questions of arms transfer and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on a worldwide scale.

As a permanent member of the Security Council, China participated in the conferences with a constructive attitude in line with its basic position of safeguarding world and regional peace, security, and stability, and helped the conference achieve positive results.

Always taking into account the overall situation of safeguarding peace in the world and the Middle East and attaching importance to the self-interests of the countries and people of the Middle East, China actively supported the proposals of the Middle East countries to establish a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and vigorously called for the realization of stability at a lower level of armament based on a principle of fairness,

rationality, comprehensiveness, and balance at the conferences. China also repeatedly stressed that the big powers with the biggest arms exports to the Middle East should realistically adopt a restrained and responsible attitude, limit the massive weapons sales to the Middle East, respect the aspirations of the people in the Middle East, and use practical actions to safeguard and promote security and stability in the region.

That some participating countries totally ignored the security interests of the countries and people of the Middle East and displayed a lack of sincerity for self-restraint, as well as a lack of a responsible attitude, formed a sharp contrast which is highlighted in the issue of the five countries informing each other regarding the transfer of weapons. This act of staying clear of the enemy's main points and striking at his weak points, of putting the cart before the horse, and of talking only about "transparency" without taking actions not only impaired the five-nation conference from playing a more effective and bigger role, but also would not bring any security to the people of the Middle East. When viewed in the context of the widely known facts of a certain country turning on its propaganda machine to accuse other countries of weapons sales and, at the same time, stepping up its own weapons sales to the Middle East, this hypocritical act of talking and selling at the same time fully demonstrates the double standard of a certain country in restricting others while indulging itself on the question of arms control.

Under the vigorous drive and insistence of China, the documents adopted at the conferences incorporated a series of principles with global significance. For instance: Arms control should observe the principle of fairness, rationality, comprehensiveness, and balance; the international transfer of conventional weapons should help bolster the legitimate defensive capability of the recipient country, prevent the escalation of tension in the concerned region, and should not be used as a means to intervene in the domestic affairs of sovereign states; under the premise of not jeopardizing the peaceful application of science and technology, no assistance may be extended to help countries develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, while a strict control will be implemented on the export of facilities, raw materials and technology related to these weapons. If these common principles agreed upon by the five countries are observed, they will be of important and positive significance. In reality, the opposite is true, however.

The ink has barely dried insofar as principles agreed upon by the five countries are concerned—notably the important principles on the abstention from using military and trade issues to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, and the prevention of escalation of regional tension when the United States, one of the five countries, went back on its word and broke its promise by openly deciding to sell F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan, wantonly interfering in the internal affairs of China, and deliberately creating tension in the Taiwan Strait region.

The lack of trustworthiness on the part of the United States turned the agreement concluded at the five-nation conference into a worthless piece of paper. This seriously jeopardizes the foundation of the five-nation conference and causes it to lose the positive significance and value originally found in its objectives and principles.

That a country should discard its reputation in pursuit of its own selfish interest can only undermine the mutual trust among countries. If agreements concluded yesterday are willfully torn apart today, then who will believe that agreements concluded today will not suffer the same fate tomorrow? Under these circumstances, where lies the meaning of carrying on with the five-nation conference?

Owing to the aforementioned, until the U.S. Government reverses its decision on the sale of fighter planes to Taiwan, it is naturally difficult for China to participate in the five-nation conference. The U.S. Government must assume full responsibility for this.

Historically speaking, there are always those who break their promise and deceive themselves and others, but they also always fry in their own grease and reap their own bitter fruit in the end.

More on Abstension

*OW2109131692 Beijing XINHUA in English
1300 GMT 21 Sep 92*

[Text] Beijing, September 20 (XINHUA)—On September 2, the United States administration, disregarding strong protests from the Chinese Government, decided to sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan. The Chinese Government finds it difficult to stay in the meeting on arms control of the five permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council, pending a reversal of the erroneous decision by the U.S. side.

On May 29, 1991, U.S. President George Bush proposed consultation among the five permanent member states of the security council on the issue of preventing the proliferation of large-scale destructive arms and transfer of conventional weapons in the Middle East. Since that time, representatives from the five states have held three rounds of talks on this issue.

The documents and agenda of the consultative meeting include not only arms control in the Middle East but also prevention of arms proliferation and transfer across the world.

China, as a permanent member state of the U.N. Security Council, has contributed to the meeting with proposals based on its fundamental position of maintaining peace, security and stability in the region as well as the world.

Because it believes in keeping peace in the Middle East and the world, and in respecting the vital interests of countries and people of that region, China supported the

suggestion by Middle East countries to establish a non-large-scale destructive arms zone in the area.

At the same time, China demanded that stability at a lower level be realized under fair, reasonable, all-round and balanced principles.

China has repeatedly stressed that a big state selling large numbers of arms in the Middle East should take real actions to maintain and improve security and stability in the region by limiting its arms sales and respecting the desire of the region's peoples.

However, quite to the contrary, some states, regardless of security and the interests of the Middle East's peoples, lacked sincerity and responsibility in arms transfers. Undue emphasis was placed on the issue of notification of arms transfer among the five states. Although this influenced them to play a larger and more constructive role in arms control, it failed to bring security of any kind to the Middle East.

Some states publicly accused other countries of selling arms, while at the same time stepping up their own arms sales in the region. This revealed the full extent of a double standard on arms control.

As a result of Chinese promotion and persistence, representatives of the five states at the meeting promised to adopt a series of principles as follows: Arms control should be based on fair, reasonable, all round and balanced principles; the international transfer of conventional weapons should aim to improve the legal self-defence of receptive countries, avoiding tension in regional situation or using arms transfer to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

If the principles agreed to by the five nations were followed, there would have been positive implications. But the reality of the situation is just the opposite of this.

Even before the ink had dried on the document setting out the agreed-upon principles, especially those referring to non-intervention in internal affairs with military sales and not aggravating regional tensions, the United States, one of the five nations, went back on its word through brazenly deciding to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan, hence brutally intervening in Chinese internal affairs and deliberately creating tensions in the Taiwan Straits area.

The United States failed to keep its word, making the principles a mere scrap of paper and severely undermining the basis of the five-nation conference on arms control. So the aim and principles of the conference have lost their positive meaning and value.

If a country loses its minimum credibility just for the sake of its own self-interest, it cannot but do harm to mutual trust between countries. If an agreement reached yesterday is broken today, will anyone be confident that today's agreement will not be torn up tomorrow? Will it make sense to take part in this kind of conference under such circumstances?

Thus, it is impossible for China to attend the five-nation conference on arms control until the United States alters its decision to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan. The United States should bear the responsibility for this.

Radiation Processing Emerging as New Industry

*HK1709015492 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1114 GMT 14 Sep 92*

[By reporter Li Xiguang (2621 1585 0342): "Nuclear Radiation Processing as New Industry in China"]

[Text] Beijing, 14 Sep (XINHUA DOMESTIC)—As a developing nuclear power, China is striving to promote the peaceful application of nuclear energy. Radiation processing, an important branch of nuclear technology, is emerging as a new industry in recent years.

China started its research in radiation processing in the 1950's. The interaction between gamma ray or electron beam on the one hand and substance on the other is applied to transformation of products, improvement of product quality, radiopreservation, pest control, sterilization, and inhibition or acceleration of growth. The development of this technology arrived at the stage of industrial application in the 1980's. So far China has developed and manufactured on its own, and also imported from abroad, quite a number of cobalt-60 radiation devices for industrial use and high-power electron accelerators, including more than 100 cobalt-60 radiation devices and nearly 30 industrial radiation accelerators. The annual output value of radiation chemical industrial products alone has now reached 150 million yuan. Nowadays China produces more than 500 metric tons of pyrocondensation [re shou suo 3583 2392 4799] products and 9,000 km of radiation electric wire and power transmission cable [fu she gao lian dian xian dian lan 6553 1410 7559 5114 7193 4848 7193 4968] a year. The aggregate sale volume of radiopreserved foodstuffs has reached 40,000 metric tons.

China has also imported commercialized, professional cobalt-60 radiation devices from abroad to build a medical product radiation sterilization center in Beijing. A single-use injector and syringe needle manufacturing plant has been built beside the sterilization center, with an annual production capacity of 50 million injectors and 100 million syringe needles.

Huang Qitao, assistant general manager of China Nuclear Industry Corporation, said China as a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency will play an active part in all constructive international activities in the radiation processing field and will do its share to promote international cooperation and exchange with countries in the Asian-Pacific region and with other countries of the world in this technological field.

In recent years, the International Atomic Energy Agency sponsored more than 30 international and nationwide training courses or seminars in China. So far a total of more than 500 Chinese and foreign students and participants have undergone training. These courses and seminars have helped promote training of radiation processing personnel in China and the Asian-Pacific region.

AUSTRALIA

Government 'Disappointed' By U.S. Nuclear Testing

BK2309082892 Hong Kong AFP in English 0812 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Text] CANBERRA, Sept 23 (AFP)—Australia is "disappointed" that the United States continues nuclear bomb tests while other "forward-looking" countries have suspended them, the government said Wednesday.

In a statement here, acting Foreign Minister Neal Blewett said the Australian Seismological Centre had detected a blast at the U.S. test site in Nevada with a yield of up to 10 kilotonnes, half the power of the Hiroshima bomb of 1945.

The test had been confirmed by the U.S. authorities this week, he said.

"Australia has welcomed the suspension of nuclear testing by Russia and France and in the light of these forward-looking decisions is disappointed that nuclear testing by others continues to take place," Blewett said.

"Whilst Australia acknowledges as a positive step the limitations on numbers and yields of nuclear tests announced by the U.S. Administration in July, Australia continues strongly to support a comprehensive test ban treaty which would prohibit all nuclear testing in all environments for all times, and we again call on all nuclear weapon states to suspend indefinitely their testing programs."

JAPAN

Government Officials Conflict on Plutonium Shipment

Plans To Avoid Strait of Malacca

OW2109085892 Tokyo KYODO in English 0844 GMT 21 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 21 KYODO—Japan will not ship plutonium through the crowded Strait of Malacca, a senior government official said Monday.

"There are a lot of pirates, so we will not go there," the official said on condition of anonymity.

Japan does not intend to inform Singapore and other Southeast Asian governments that have expressed concern that the ship carrying plutonium from Europe to Japan might be routed through the busy waterway, he said.

Reacting to environmental campaigns, Tokyo informed some 100 governments earlier this year it planned to ship the plutonium home from France this fall for use in nuclear power plants.

But the government has said it will keep the actual route secret for security reasons.

Report Denied; Route Not Set

OW2209040792 Tokyo KYODO in English 0312 GMT 22 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 22 KYODO—The top government spokesman denied Tuesday that Japan has decided to avoid the busy Malacca Strait when it ships plutonium home from France this fall.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato was commenting on a remark by a senior government source Monday that Japan would not route the plutonium via the Strait of Malacca because of piracy in the region.

"The route will be decided shortly before the ship leaves France. The route has not yet been decided," Kato told a news conference.

Kato offered no new assurances to Southeast Asian nations that have expressed concern over the shipment proceeding through the strait.

The government will continue to respond to their anxieties by explaining it has taken thorough safety measures, Kato said.

Kato added he does not expect the issue to damage bilateral relations with nations lining the strait.

Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have objected to the shipments going through the strait.

But the government has said it will not make public the actual route in order to deter possible terrorist attacks.

A specially refitted freighter, the 3,800-ton Akatsuki Maru, is now on its way to France to pick up a ton of plutonium which it will bring back to Japan. It will be accompanied back by an armed escort vessel, the 6,500-ton Shikishima.

Supreme Court Overturns Ruling in Monju Case

OW2209042192 Tokyo KYODO in English 0337 GMT 22 Sep 92

[Text] Tokyo, Sept. 22 KYODO—The Supreme Court on Tuesday dismissed rulings by lower courts that rejected a suit and disqualified plaintiffs seeking to block the construction of Japan's first plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactor, called Monju.

The Supreme Court ruled that all plaintiffs living within or beyond a radius of 20 kilometers from the reactor's site are qualified to file the lawsuit and referred the case back to the Fukui District Court for reexamination.

In September 1985, a total of 39 residents in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture, filed a suit with the Fukui District Court demanding the nullification of the government's permission to build the Monju fast breeder nuclear reactor in Tsuruga.

The residents also asked the court to issue an injunction ordering an immediate halt to the reactor's operations. A ruling in this case is still pending.

In a separate court trial in December 1987, the Fukui District Court turned down a suit from the same plaintiffs seeking to invalidate the reactor's construction.

The court said the second lawsuit had no merit because the other suit aims to halt the operation of the reactor.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Nagoya High Court, which ruled in July 1989 that 17 of the plaintiffs, who lived within 20 kilometers of the site, were qualified to file a suit and sent the case back to the district court for retrial.

Twenty-two of the disqualified plaintiffs and the state appealed to the Supreme Court.

In its ruling Tuesday, the Supreme Court said residents living in an area 29 kilometers to 58 kilometers from the plant would be highly likely to be exposed to grave danger in the event of an accident at the reactor.

The construction of the Monju started in October 1985 and first nuclear fission chain reactions in it are expected early next year.

NORTH KOREA

Chief Delegate to IAEA Holds News Conference

SK2009012792 *Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 2300 GMT 19 Sep 92*

[Text] The chief of our country's delegation to the September Board of Governors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Vienna, Austria, held a news conference at IAEA Headquarters on 17 September.

The IAEA deputy general director, the chief of an IAEA information department, newspapers and news agency reporters, and reporters from Japanese, U.S., French, German, and other countries' radio were there.

Our country's chief delegate spoke at the news conference: He said that removing the danger of nuclear war and living in a world free of nuclear weapons are not only the unanimous desire of the people from all countries but also the basic idea behind the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He added that we have raised the issue of removing the nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula not only as an issue of life and death for our nation but also as the essential demand for peace. He said that we have made steady efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

After pointing out that the issue of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula has not been resolved because of the differences of opinion between the North and the South, he said: A major stumbling block to implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization is nuclear inspection. According to the nuclear safeguards accord

required by the IAEA, we have accepted irregular inspections [pichonggisachal] three times. The IAEA inspections proved that our nuclear facilities are for peaceful purposes. We are receiving the IAEA inspections. Thus, the South Korean side should also accept our claim that overall inspection to confirm the absence of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases must be conducted.

The South Korean side has objected to inspection of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in South Korea since the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee held its first meeting. Even worse, it has not included the clause agreeing to an overall inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in the draft agreements on the regulations for nuclear inspection.

The South side, while talking about trial inspection and inspection of equal numbers of sites, wants the inspection of our general military bases. This has nothing to do with the joint declaration on denuclearization.

The inspection of general military bases is not under the authority of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee. If the inspection of general military bases is necessary for arms reduction between the North and the South, the North-South Military Committee can discuss the work.

The issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula originated from U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea. Therefore, in order to implement the joint declaration of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, inspection to confirm the existence of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in South Korean should be conducted first.

Information showing that U.S. nuclear submarines still call at the U.S. nuclear submarine base in Chinhea in South Korea was revealed. This stresses the importance of inspecting U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in South Korea.

Nonetheless, the United States and South Korea have recently insisted that we must accept the inspection of general military bases. This insistence is a major stumbling block to implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. We claim that, because the South Korean side announced the absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea, it should accept inspection of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in order to prove the absence of nuclear weapons.

South Korea's demand for special inspection [tukpyolsachal] becomes a major stumbling block to implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Article Four of the joint declaration on denuclearization stipulates that the sites chosen by the other side and the sites agreed upon by both sides should be inspected. The South Korean side is insisting on special inspection counter to the article, however.

We hope that the meeting of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee will proceed according to the contents already agreed upon.

Another stumbling block is the adoption of an agreement on implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization. Accepting an agreement on implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization is required by the North-South agreement. This is an essential demand for smoothly operating the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee.

Since the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee held its first meeting on 19 March 1992, we have put forward to the South Korean side not only the draft agreement on implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization but also the draft agreement on verifying the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

After exposing in detail the South Korean side's confession that it has no intent to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, he noted:

Such an action of the South Korean side, which has objected to accepting an agreement on implementing the joint declaration on denuclearization, is a stumbling block to achieving results from North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee meetings.

We will make all sincere efforts to rapidly implement the joint declaration of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.

After his speech, he answered reporters' questions.

IAEA Delegate Makes Speech on Nuclear Issue

*SK2109065392 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0500 GMT 21 Sep 92*

[Text] Pyongyang September 21 (KCNA)—The head of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a speech at the September meeting of the Board of the Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna on September 16.

He said:

It is a consistent principled stand of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to realize the denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula by remaining faithful to the noble idea and mission specified in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

Recalling that, after the June meeting of the board of the governors of the IAEA, the DPRK accepted the second and third irregular inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities by the IAEA and agreed to and effectuated the general rules of the supplementary detailed regulations under the Nuclear Safeguards Accord (NSA), he said:

Facts show that each inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities by the IAEA proves more clearly the peaceful purpose of the DPRK government's program of nuclear power development and the innocence of its use.

We have discharged our obligations in the implementation of the nuclear safeguards accord [NSA], taking active and go-ahead steps in succession from the signing of the NSA and its endorsement to the three rounds of inspection by the IAEA and effectuation of the supplementary detailed regulations.

We will in the future, too, make all sincere efforts to show the consistency of the nuclear policy of the DPRK Government through inspection of our nuclear facilities by the IAEA.

By honestly fulfilling our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, we will thoroughly denuclearize the Korean peninsula and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy in reliance upon technical cooperation with the IAEA and its member nations.

The general director of the IAEA at a press conference upon the closure of the September meeting of the board of the governors on September 18, touched upon the nuclear problem of the DPRK.

He said: Three rounds of irregular inspection have been made since my Korean visit in May. The third inspection team came back some time ago. After the third inspection, two objects were inspected, irrespective of reports. Cooperation between the IAEA and the DPRK is going on smoothly.

The general director said that various countries were behaving affirmatively to increase the transparency of their nuclear programs voluntarily beyond the framework of the nuclear safeguards accord and the DPRK is one of them.

Premier Proposes Five-Point Plan on Japan

*SK1609050392 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0432 GMT 16 Sep 92*

["Premier Yon Hyong-muk on North Side's Stand Regarding Implementation of the North-South Agreement and Joint Declaration on Denuclearisation and Joint Action Against Japan"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang September 16 (KCNA)—Speaking at the first-day session of the 8th North-South high-level talks which is open here, Yon Hyong-muk, premier of the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who is heading the North side's delegation, manifested our side's stand on some immediate problems arising in implementing the North-South agreement and the joint declaration on denuclearisation, the problems of Yi In-mo's repatriation and the release of visitors to the North and the problem of joint action against Japan, jointly. etc.

As regards the discussion of annexed agreements, first of all, he made clear the North side's view on the South side's wrong argument.

He said, firstly, the basic spirit of the North-South agreement must not be distorted, secondly, the character

of the relationship between the the North and the South must be understood correctly, thirdly the issue with regard to recognizing the "entity" must be dealt with properly.

He said: The South side denies the spirit of independence, the basic spirit of the North-South agreement, and tries to turn North-South relations into relations between "two states." This shows that the South side attaches prime importance to relations with foreign forces and to the narrow-minded unilateral interests than reunification as a whole.

The South side is attempting to legalize the division of our country into two as a division of "states", talking about the recognition of the "real existence of states" and of "authority". This is intended to apply the principle of noninterference between states to the internal affairs of the opposite side.

He referred to some problems arising in implementing the North-South agreement and joint declaration on denuclearisation.

He said: Firstly, we must finalize the annexed agreements.

So we must try every possible means to have the drafts of the annexed agreements completed and make them adopted and put into effect at the current talks.

Secondly, the matter of the existence of subcommittees.

The subcommittees are, to all intents and purposes, consultative organisations within the framework of the high-level talks. Therefore, we should think that the subcommittees will exist as long as the high-level talks exist.

Thirdly, agreements at the joint committees and the methods of their implementation.

The principle of package agreement and simultaneous practice is the correct principle to solve questions most fairly.

By the principle of package agreement and simultaneous practice we do not mean to wait till a consensus is reached on all the points of agreement and to put them into effect in a package, however. For the acceleration of the implementation of the points of agreement I propose to work out yearly or quarterly working plans and carry the points into practice according to the plans.

Fourthly, the implementation of the joint declaration on denuclearisation.

The "principle of mutual inspection of the same numbers" that the South side advocates does not correspond at all to the specific conditions of our country where nuclear suspicion differs greatly between the sides. The so-called "special inspection" might cause unexpected disputes. So the South side should reexamine the draft regulations proposed by it.

The head of our side's delegation expressed deep concern over the delay of the repatriation of Mr. Yi In-mo and strongly demanded that he be sent back to the North without further delay and, at the same time, hoped that Rev. Mun Ik-hwan, Coed Yim Su-kyong, father Mun Kyu-hyon, Mr. Yu Won-ho and others who visited the North will be released without fail before the term of office of the "Sixth Republic" expires.

He proposed once again that working-level talks of the Red Cross organisations of the two sides be opened and the exchange of old parents' visiting groups and art troupes be realized at an early date on condition that obstacles are removed.

Yon Hyong-muk proposed to the South side to carefully discuss the question of a joint action against Japan and adopt an agreement on it and set forth a draft agreement of the North side. Follows the draft of the five-point agreement.

1. The North and the South shall exert joint efforts to make the Japanese Government apologize and compensate for the inhumane crimes committed by the Japanese imperialists in the past such as the issue of "comfort women for the army".

2. The North and the South shall take a joint action to correct the past history in which Japanese imperialism "legalized" their colonial occupation of our country by forging "treaties".

3. The North and the South shall take a joint action in checking Japan's nuclear armament and overseas dispatch of troops.

4. The North and the South shall propose jointly and actualize talks between the North-South authorities and the Japanese authorities in order to discuss and solve the problems of measures toward Japan in accordance with the desire and interests of the whole nation.

5. The North and the South shall form and run the North-South joint committee for measures toward Japan as an organization to discuss and practise jointly the above-mentioned problems.

SOUTH KOREA

IAEA Head Says North To Allow Check of Facilities

SK2109095792 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
0910 GMT 21 Sep 92

[Report by correspondent Cha Man-sun from Vienna]

[Text] The 36th annual general meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] opened in Vienna, the capital of Austria, on the afternoon of 21 September Korean time. About 110 member states are attending the general meeting, which will continue until 25 September. The meeting participants will comprehensively discuss

issues on measures for promoting international cooperation in nuclear safety, on intensifying the nuclear inspection system, and on the IAEA's nuclear inspection in the Middle East.

In the opening speech, Hans Blix, IAEA secretary general, said that despite efforts by nuclear powers to prevent nuclear proliferation, including the United States' and Russia's expeditious reduction and withdrawal of their strategic nuclear weapons, problems on guaranteeing nuclear safety have been continuously raised in some areas. He pointed out that two cases of important nuclear inspections are being carried out in South Africa and North Korea. He reported that North Korea promised to enable IAEA inspectors to visit all its facilities irrespective of its previous reports.

S&T Minister Proposes Asian Nuclear Safety Group

SK2209022892 Seoul YONHAP in English 0135 GMT 22 Sep 92

[Text] Vienna, Sept. 21 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korean Science and Technology Minister Kim Chin-hyon proposed Monday establishing a northeast Asian nuclear cooperation organization to prevent nuclear accidents.

He expressed deep concern about the safety of North Korean reactors, calling for world attention to developing appropriate safety improvement measures.

Kim made the proposals in his keynote speech at the 36th general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"Severe nuclear accidents are not national but global in scope. It is urgent that there be established regional organizations or other fora for cooperation among neighboring states and necessary assistance be given for these purposes within the IAEA," Kim told the conference.

He called on northeast Asian countries to contribute to the nuclear community for establishing international credibility.

"I believe this can be accomplished by making all of their nuclear facilities available to one another as well as by transferring advanced technologies and exchanging information among them," he said.

Kim said IAEA inspections of North Korea had not reduced suspicion of its nuclear development as Pyongyang was building a commercial-scale reprocessing facility despite a complete lack of industrial demand.

"We remain deeply concerned about the safety of the reactors pointed out by (IAEA director-general Hans) Blix during his visit. It is believed that the engineered safety features of the North Korean reactors, which were developed by North Korea alone, fall far below international safety standards," he said.

"In this connection, my delegation requests the agency to pay special attention to the safety problems of the North Korean nuclear facilities and to develop appropriate safety improvement measures accordingly," Kim told the conference.

Other member countries including Japan addressed North Korea's nuclear problem in their keynote speeches and urged Pyongyang to accept inter-Korean nuclear inspection.

IAEA sources said agency inspectors detected safety problems in North Korean reactors such as partly damaged nuclear fuel and corrosion in spent fuel storage tanks.

South Korean experts predicted that while accidents at the Yongbyon nuclear reactor would not greatly affect South Korea, accidents at the facility under construction in Taechon, northern Pyongan Province, could reach the South.

THAILAND

EGAT Making Plans for Nuclear Power Plants

BK1809043092 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 18 Sep 92 pp 18, 26

[Text] As many as six nuclear power stations are being planned by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) for installation between 1997 and 2001. The six units, each with a generating capacity of 1,000 MW, were listed in the master electrification programme under the Eighth National Plan (1997-2001) the state utility agency has submitted to the Government for approval.

The EGAT and government officials earlier suggested that only two 1,000-MW units were planned to be operational in the year 2006. But under the report, the country's first 1,000-MW nuclear power unit is scheduled to be operational in January 2006 and the second set in July of the same year; the second and third in 2007 and the fifth and sixth a year later. Senior EGAT officials said the numbers as listed in the programme may be subject to change, however, depending on government policy and the public acceptance of this form of energy. They said the nuclear power plants were proposed against the backdrop of dwindling sources of other energy options and opposition to coal-fired and hydro-power at a time of fast growing domestic electricity demand.

An industry observer said the plan to up nuclear power stations was not made public because EGAT may be concerned that it would prematurely cause a higher degree of public protest against the plan even before the first units could get off the ground. They may think that it might be easier to win public acceptance for only two units, he said.

"You will scare them (the public) immediately if you tell them you're going to have six," he said. It is apparent that EGAT's immediate target to have the first two 1,000-MW units come onstream in the year 2006, however. Indeed, nuclear energy forms a crucial part in the EGAT's development of new generating sources under the eighth plan which calls for the installation of 13,526 MW capacity.

Meanwhile, the EGAT is hiring Burns & Roe Co of the U.S. to assist it in a study on the configuration and location of the proposed nuclear power plants. The firm conducted a feasibility study on the nuclear power project for the EGAT in the 1970s which concluded that a 300-600 MW plant would be suitable in 1981.

Ao Phai, 130 km southeast of Bangkok, was chosen as the location. That site is now being turned the kingdom's

first coal-fired power plant, now being delayed under a recent government decision pending further environmental studies.

The EGAT's internal investigation of nuclear power projects is proceeding, especially on the question of waste disposal and plant locations.

On the nuclear project site, the crucial consideration is easy access to water resources because the plant will require substantial water. Furthermore, it should be close to the water way to facilitate transport of the plant itself and fuel, a senior EGAT official said.

As a result, the proposed nuclear power plant should be located on the country's seashore either in southern Thailand or the eastern seaboard, though inland possibilities are not totally ruled out. The Thai authority said these internal studies are required to prepare the EGAT for the launch of the nuclear power plant as and when the government gives final approval.

ARGENTINA**Sale of Nuclear Reactor to Egypt Confirmed***PY2209150092 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
ARGENTINAS in Spanish 2232 GMT 21 Sep 92*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 21 Sep (NA)—The National Commission for Atomic Energy [CNEA] today officially confirmed the sale of a nuclear reactor to Egypt. The reactor will be installed in Inshas with the participation of specialized personnel of that country and the local industry.

The contract was signed on 19 September by Muhammad Mahir Abazah, the Egyptian electricity and energy minister, and Argentine Ambassador to Egypt Jorge de Belaustegui.

The CNEA communique states that the experimental reactor will be basically used for nuclear medicine, material radiation, basic scientific research, atom technology, and personnel training.

The communique highlights the excellent relations between the two countries and between their Presidents Carlos Menem and Husni Mubarak who helped the deal involving the Argentine nuclear reactor, overcoming offers from developed countries.

[Words indistinct] the National Commission for Control of Sensitive [words indistinct] and War Materiel provided the license for the sale of the reactor, obtaining a guarantee that all installations related to the contract will be used exclusively for peaceful means.

The reactor will also be covered by the current safeguards agreement existing between the IAEA and the Egyptian Government.

Rio Negro Provincial Governor Horacio Massaccesi and Carlos Soria and Carlos Machado, both national deputies of that province, went to Egypt for the signing of the agreement.

Reports on Japanese Shipment of Plutonium**Government Notes Concern***PY1809173892 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2108 GMT
17 Sep 92*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 17 Sep (TELAM)—The Argentine Government today voiced its concern over the possible harm the Japanese ship Akatsuki Maru, loaded with plutonium, may cause to people and the environment in passing by the Argentine coast.

This was reported by the Foreign Ministry, which stated that the appropriate information is being requested from the Japanese, French, and U.S. Governments through the corresponding diplomatic channels in order to evaluate the events and determine the appropriate action to be taken.

According to an official communique, the United States was asked to provide information because "this country supplied the raw material."

The communique says that in light of similar concern expressed by the Brazilian and Chilean Governments, "contacts have been established with these countries" to coordinate actions intended to prevent any risk this ship may pose.

It states that the Argentine Government "will demand strict compliance with international laws."

Escorts To Ensure Safe Passage*PY2009231192 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES
HERALD in English 19 Sep 92 p 11*

[Text] A Japanese ship carrying over a ton of plutonium is to be given permission to sail through Argentine waters, passing with its highly dangerous and toxic cargo around the volatile waters of the Cape Horn off the southern tip of the country.

The Akatsuki Maru is currently on its way to the French port of Cherbourg, where it will load up with the plutonium, which will be used to power nuclear energy plants in Japan. The cargo is said to be highly dangerous and the equivalent of 120 atomic bombs.

Environmentalists claim that the decision to allow the ship to pass by the southern tip of the country could lead to a disaster because these are some of the most difficult waters in the world to navigate.

The ship is due to pass through Argentine territory in three weeks' time and will be given an escort by the Argentine Navy to ensure its safe passage. Representatives of the campaigning environmental group Greenpeace are meeting the government after reports that the United States, New Zealand, Australia and other countries in the Pacific region have refused the ship entry to their waters.

"The United States has refused to allow the ship to pass through the Panama Canal, and this is why it is taking the long route back to Japan. The plutonium is dangerous and the equivalent of 10 atomic bombs. If the ship was to crash, it would be one of the worst nuclear disasters in the world," said Juan Schroeder of Greenpeace.

The US Embassy in Buenos Aires was not available for comment but the Argentine Government has said that it will ensure that the ship stays at least 200 miles from the coastline and that all precautions will be taken to prevent any accident.

"Most of the ship's journey is through international waters and only a small part of it is through Argentine waters. Other ships carrying similar substances have passed through our waters before without any problems," said a spokesman.

Japan transports more than five tons of re-processed plutonium a year to and from the nuclear power plant in Sellafield, north-west of England, and others in France.

BRAZIL

Nuclear Commission To Offer Data to Universities

*PY2209011392 Brasilia Voz do Brasil Network
in Portuguese 2200 GMT 21 Sep 92*

[Text] Public and private universities will have access to the data stored at the Scientific and Technological Center of the National Nuclear Energy Commission [CNEN].

In order to expedite this process, CNEN today sent the universities a letter informing them of its plans to provide, via on-line [preceding word in English], the CNEN data bank information on various areas and activities such as the environment and industry.

This information was released by CNEN Informatics Department director (Ricardo Jabasse), who said he believes the universities will answer in 15 days, and that at least 60 percent of them will have joined the data bank in 30 days.

(Jabasse) said the main objective of this decision is to improve CNEN's image in the eyes of society and the academic community.

[Begin (Jabasse) recording] We intend to promote the use of this type of resource so that we gradually can build a significant local information market, so that in the near

future we may significantly increase the number of users of our information centers. [end recording]

The CNEN data bank's data will be supplied to the universities free. In order to have access to the data, it will be enough to have a microcomputer and a modem to use the [word indistinct] system.

CUBA

CEA Official Reiterates Willingness To Sign NPT

*FL1709013892 Havana Radio Rebelde Network
in Spanish 2300 GMT 16 Sep 92*

[Text] Today, Cuba reiterated its willingness to sign the treaty prohibiting nuclear arms in Latin America, once other countries in the region sign it. Andre Garcia de la Cruz, executive secretary of the Cuban Atomic Energy Commission [CEA], while speaking at the first session of the International Atomic Energy Organization Governors Council, stated that Cuba has accepted the proposed changes to the document, which (Lou Verde) recently received in Mexico.

Garcia de la Cruz also said that amendments to the treaty from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, as well as modifications later suggested by Mexico, do not present difficulties for Cuba and are therefore acceptable. Remember that in October 1992, the Fourth Communist Party of Cuba Congress approved a resolution on foreign policies that expresses the country's willingness to assume the obligations of the Tlatelolco Treaty with regard to Latin American unity, when Latin America unanimously accepts them.

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

Defense Ministry Denies Use of CW

*LD1909005392 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in English
2140 GMT 18 Sep 92*

[Text] The press center of the Armenian Defense Ministry refuted new Azeri attempts to accuse Armenia of using chemical weapons. It informed a reporter from the Free Press Organization that Azeri news about an alleged use of chemical weapons in the (Tarus) region did not correspond to reality. It is worth reminding our listeners that following a similar Azeri wailing a few months earlier United Nations specialists arriving into the disputed area had found no evidence of chemical usage whatsoever.

At the same time, the press center of [the] Armenian Defense Ministry informed that Azeri forces had on the night of 17 September bombarded Yeraskhavan, the (Vahan) village of the Krasnoselsk region, the (Nuvadi) of the (Meri) region, as well as the Bartsruni village of the Vayk region. One person was wounded in Yeraskhavan. Piling up of enemy forces on the borderline between Sisyan, Goris, Vayk and Nakhichevan is continuing.

EGYPT

U.S., Canada Oppose Purchase of Chinese Reactors

*NC2309110892 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18 Sep 92
p 1*

[Report by 'Adil al-Bahnasawi]

[Text] In the past two weeks, U.S. and Canadian officials have been holding contacts with the Egyptian Government to prevent Egypt from holding talks with China on importing small nuclear reactors. The foreign officials have expressed their concern over the president's recent statements on Egypt's intention to import these reactors from China.

The U.S. side has agreed to let the American Bechtel Company cooperate with the Nuclear Reactors Authority on nuclear studies if Egypt stops its talks with China.

The Canadian side has stated that the Canadian Atomic Energy Commission will participate with Egypt in drawing up the blueprints for a 600-megawatt Cando reactor. The Canadian Atomic Energy Commission will also participate in the program for manufacturing nuclear fuel in Inshas.

A Nuclear Reactors Authority source noted that Bechtel will participate only in the studies; it will not carry out any construction work. Bechtel's presence in nuclear reactors aims to follow Egypt's nuclear activity.

Egyptian experts are viewing with concern Israel's bid to transport a 440-megawatt reactor from Russia to the Negev desert. The reactor will be located in "Shifta," 25

km from the Egyptian al-'Awjah area. The experts have said that the Foreign Ministry has asked the Nuclear Safety Center to prepare a study on the reactor's proximity to the Egyptian border and the danger of any accident at this reactor for the Suez Canal.

Deal Signed With Argentina To Import Reactor

*NC2009075792 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1405 GMT
19 Sep 92*

[Excerpt] Cairo, 19 Sep (MENA)—Egypt signed an agreement with Argentina today to import a reactor with limited capability from an Argentine specialist company to use for peaceful purposes.

Electricity and Energy Minister Engineer Mahir Abazah, who attended the signing of the agreement, stated that the new reactor's power is 22 megawatts; it will be used only to produce isotopes necessary to develop the scientific and technological infrastructure and to exploit the desert. It will also be used in nutrition, agriculture, industry, health, water resources, and basic and applied scientific research. He added that the reactor will cost 44.476 million dollars and will be operational within five years.

Atomic Energy Authority Chairman Dr. Fawzi Hammad signed for Egypt and the Argentine company's representative in Cairo for Argentina. [passage omitted]

INDIA

Paper Details Nuclear Power Development Program

*BK1809164792 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES
in English 4 Sep 92 p 11*

[Text] NEW DELHI, Sept. 3—Even as the first unit of the Kakrapar nuclear power station today attained "criticality" at 12.28 p.m., two years behind schedule the Atomic Energy Commission said efforts were on to further reduce the gestation period for nuclear power plants from the current level of eight years.

The Kakrapar unit itself was completed within eight years of starting civil works against 12 years and more required for the earlier power plants at Kalpakkam, Narora and Kota. The schedule to complete it by 1990 was upset due to design changes. Another power plant is on the way to completion at Kaiga in Karnataka and the second unit of the Kakrapar plant is at an advanced stage of construction, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) said. With the attainment of "criticality" the fissile reaction of the uranium fuel gets sustained releasing heat.

At present, a total of five pressurised heavy water reactors [PHWR] of 220 MW capacity each (total 1100 MW) are under construction. Two other units of 500 MW each

of the same type are also under construction while nine others are awaiting sanction, according to the DAE.

On the question of safety, the DAE again reassured claiming that only low and medium level radioactive wastes were generated at Kakrapar unit. These would be treated and then stored underground. The ground level radiation would be "insignificance". Later the spent fuel would be reprocessed.

To monitor the safety aspect, the DAE said data had already been collected about the environmental situation before the operation of the reactor and this would be regularly compared with data of the environment after the reactor starts operation.

The Kakrapar unit situated 86 km from Surat city in Gujarat has cost Rs [rupees] 1084 crore (for the twin unit). The per kwh [kilowatt-hour] cost of generation was computed at Rs 1.70 per unit "based on the prevailing norms". When the power plant would be on full power generation, the electricity generated would be shared by the neighbouring States through the Western Regional Grid.

Though the standard nuclear power reactor is having a capacity of 235 MW, the DAE has rated it at 220 MW for technical reasons. The DAE is also building a 500 MW nuclear power reactor and is designing a prototype fast breeder reactor of 500 MW. The latter would take the country towards what is known as the second phase of N-power generation using the plutonium obtained from the spent fuel rods from the PHWR reactors at Kota, Kalpakkam etc. The nuclear power plants are built and maintained by the Nuclear Power Corporation of DAE.

The DAE assured that the eight heavy water plants now working would provide the necessary heavy water for the n-power plants. Each nuclear power reactor needs 40 tonnes of uranium fuel and 200 tonnes of heavy water for the initial feed which is recycled and regularly upgraded. Everyday 100 kg of fuel would have to be replaced which is equivalent to 2,500 tonnes of coal burning in a thermal power station. Loading and unloading of fuel while the reactor is on is done by computerised fuelling machines through remote control. Every component has been built in this country.

Reactor safety is ensured, the DAE said, through three separate and independently acting systems. First, is the reactor shutdown systems. The Kakrapar unit has two fast shut down systems. The primary one works by cadmium shut off rods at 14 locations which drop down in case of heat build up and render the reactor sub-critical in two seconds. There are 12 liquid shut off rods as a back up, further backed by slow acting automatic liquid poison addition system which absorbs neutrons completely and stop the fissile reaction.

In case of sudden loss of coolant heavy water inside the reactor, there is an emergency core cooling system which also stops the fissile reaction. Lastly, the pressure suppression system in which cool water under the reactor

risers automatically to reduce pressure in case it increases and a double containment wall ensures that no radioactivity would be released at ground level even in case of an unlikely accident.

DAE has also evolved emergency preparedness plans for meeting any accident even after all these safety measures. It ensures a high level of preparedness to face an accident including protecting the plant personnel and surrounding population. There is no human settlement for five km belt around a nuclear power installation as a mandatory provision.

Action Taken Against Firm Exporting Chemical

BK2209163892 Hong Kong AFP in English 1328 GMT 22 Sep 92

[Text] New Delhi, Sept 22 (AFP)—The Indian Government is taking action against a Bombay-based company for exporting to Syria a dual-purpose chemical that can be used to make nerve gas, it was announced Tuesday.

An External Affairs Ministry spokesman said United Phosphorus Ltd. did not get permission from the government to sell trimethyl phosphite (TMP) early this year.

"This violation of the Government of India's import and export regulation has been brought to the attention of the customs authorities for instituting necessary action," the spokesman told reporters here. He did not elaborate.

He said India's commitment to curbing proliferation of chemical weapons was "unequivocal," adding that TMP was among four chemicals that cannot be exported without official authorisation.

The TIMES OF INDIA newspaper quoted Raju D. Shroff, chairman and managing director of United Phosphorus Ltd., as saying that Syria had contacted the firm in 1991 for 45 tonnes of TMP, allegedly to make pesticides.

Shroff told the daily that after exporting one lot, he had decided not to sell any more TMP to Damascus following requests by the U.S. consul in Bombay.

"The Americans suspected that supplies of TMP could be diverted by Syria to Libya and Iran for making nerve gas," the TIMES said.

The second shipment was stopped in mid-ocean by German officials, and the newspaper said it was expected to end up in Taiwan with the permission of the U.S. Government.

Ministry Reaffirms Commitment to Curb CW

BK2209160892 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 1530 GMT 22 Sep 92

[Text] India has reiterated its unequivocal commitment to curbing proliferation of chemical weapons as reflected in the export control regime. The spokesman of the

External Affairs Ministry told newsmen that New Delhi will continue to exercise effective control on export of such chemicals. He expressed confidence that the coming into effect of the chemical weapons convention will be a positive step forward for the only universal and nondiscriminatory agreement which provides for effective means to tackle the problem of proliferation.

IRAN

IAEO Head Scores 'Zionist Propaganda'

NC2309104492 *Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0430 GMT 23 Sep 92*

[Text] The vice president and head of the Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran [IAEO] spoke at the 36th general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Vienna yesterday. Stressing that our country's nuclear programs are peaceful, he called for international forums to help it implement these programs.

Amrollahi referred to an Iranian proposal on freeing the Middle East of nuclear arms and strongly condemned the West for directly or indirectly supporting the Zionist regime's nuclear programs.

Referring to false propaganda by the Zionist regime on Iranian nuclear programs, the IAEO head said the objective behind this propaganda is to justify nonpeaceful use of nuclear energy by the Zionist regime.

Stressing that the Islamic Republic of Iran insists on completing the Bushehr power plant, the IAEO head criticized the German Government for refusing to issue the necessary export licenses to complete the plant.

He also stated that Iran has signed agreements with China and Russia to buy nuclear power plants for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

IRNA reports from Vienna that on the first day of the conference, three new countries—Croatia, Slovenia, and Uzbekistan—became members of the IAEA.

IRAQ

UN Experts Arrive To Check CW Stocks

NC2109143492 *Paris AFP in English 1245 GMT 21 Sep 92*

[Text] Baghdad, Sept 21 (AFP) - A team of U.N. weapons experts arrived Monday in Baghdad to check that Iraq has moved all its stocks of chemical weapons to a common site for destruction.

Bernhard Brunner, their Swiss chief, told journalists his six-strong team would visit "various sites" where chemical weapons were once stored "to see how much chemical ammunition is there, to see whether it has been moved or it has been destroyed."

Before meeting Iraqi officials Brunner would not reveal which sites the six-member team planned to visit. He said yesterday the team would certainly be using helicopters to reach the sites.

He also said his team did not intend to visit al-Muthana, once the heart of Iraq's chemical weapons industry, during the 44th mission to Iraq under United Nations disarmament resolutions ending the 1991 Gulf war.

Iraq is meant to have moved nerve and mustard gas to al-Muthana, 130 kilometres (80 miles) northwest of Baghdad, for destruction in two incinerators.

It is to begin destroying 140 tonnes of nerve gas at the end of September and 400 tonnes of mustard gas two months from now, U.N. weapons expert Ron Manley said on a visit earlier this month.

The mission is to come back from Iraq via Bahrain on September 29.

U.S. Accused of Using 'Atomic Weapons' in War

JN2009132292 *Baghdad INA in English 1245 GMT 20 Sep 92*

[Text] Baghdad, Sep. 20, INA—German Professor Sikwarth Gunther chairman of the Humanitarian Assistance Society has reiterated that the United States and its allies used during the U.S.-led 30-state war against Iraq fatal atomic weapons.

In a statement to AL-QADISIYAH daily for today, professor Gunther said that some samples of these weapons which were heavy-weight bullets like a cigarette were placed under tests in Berlin laboratory by specialists in this field.

The tests proved that these bullets have atomic radiation of grave health and environmental effects.

Professor Gunther said that the society consists of three organizations in Germany, Berlin and Vienna, founded in 1990.

He added that the society addressed several appeals to various world states on the necessity of breaking the economic blockade imposed on Iraq since August 1990, for its grave consequences.

ISRAEL

Chinese Foreign Minister on Arms Transfers

TA1609182892 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
1705 GMT 16 Sep 92

[Excerpts] Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen held a news conference in Jerusalem a short time ago. Our correspondent Gid'on Remez, who attended it, says it was rather an odd event.

[Begin Remez recording] It was not exactly a news conference, as we know it. The visiting minister would only answer five questions, which were submitted to him in writing about two weeks ago. That is why no exciting disclosures were expected from the outset, but he made one nevertheless: He denied that there had been any kind of military cooperation between Israel and the PRC prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations, as insistently reported in the foreign press. [passage omitted]

Cooperation between industrial plants in both countries is not out of the question today, the Chinese minister said, but there is no question of transferring the technology of others to China or of China to others. This remark apparently came in response to the U.S. arguments that Israel had sold China the secrets of the Patriot missile.

The minister reiterated China's protest over the sale of U.S. F-16's to Taiwan. According to Qian, Taiwan is part of China. Consequently, the sale is interference in China's internal affairs. Nevertheless, he emphasized that China's boycott of the talks the five permanent Security Council members are holding on curbing arms deliveries to the Middle East does not apply to the multilateral talks in Moscow. Although we play an active role in the talks on arms control there, the minister stressed, one should not expect more than an expression of views before something is attained in the bilateral talks.

China is a minor arms supplier to the Middle East, the visiting minister emphasized, in yet another dig at the Americans who are the largest suppliers. As for the nuclear reactors that China is selling Iran, Qian said: After all, Iran has signed the international treaties which compel it to use the reactors for peaceful purposes only.

Chinese Statement on Arms Sales Contradictory

TA1809100292 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
18 Sep 92 p A3

[Report by political correspondent 'Aqiva Eldar]

[Excerpt] A mistranslation from Chinese into English yesterday produced a contradiction between the prime minister's bureau statement that PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had promised his country would sell no weapons to the Middle East and the clarification supplied by the Chinese delegation in reply to a question,

according to which China does not totally rule out arms sales to the region. According to the Chinese, the wording employed at the minister's news conference on 16 September and during his meeting with Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres is the valid one. They further assert that China takes care to supply weapons for self-defense only, and even then, it does so in limited quantities and in a manner that does not upset the balance in tense areas.

The communique issued by the prime minister's bureau in the wake of Rabin's meeting with the Chinese foreign minister in his Tel Aviv office stated that the Chinese minister had commended the new Israeli Government's policy and the flexibility it has shown in the peace negotiations. According to the minister, China wants to see the peace process promoted and is confident the conflict can be resolved through peaceful means only.

Qian thanked Rabin for the decision not to sell Kfir aircraft to Taiwan, stressing that China would not do anything that is liable to harm the peace process. Political sources in Jerusalem noted that the political echelons' decision against selling Kfirs to Taiwan is insignificant, and that the Chinese also realized the deal could not have been carried out in any event because Taiwan had decided to purchase F-16's from the United States. [passage omitted]

Russia Not Selling N-Weapons to Arab Countries

TA1609183992 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
1705 GMT 16 Sep 92

[Text] Aleksandr Bovin, Russia's ambassador to Israel, says that there is no chance of his country having sold or selling in the future any kind of nuclear weapons to the Arab countries or other countries in the world. He visited Beersheba today, and our correspondent Nisim Qeynan met him there.

[Begin recording] [Qeynan] Russia's position on the Middle East peace negotiations is identical to that of the United States, Ambassador Bovin stated. According to him, Russia's role in the negotiating process is to create the preliminary conditions for negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries but not to conduct them in their place.

[Bovin in Russian, followed by Hebrew translation] We accept any version that satisfies Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, or Israel and Lebanon. We cannot conduct the negotiations for you, however.

[Qeynan] As for the nuclear weapons in the CIS and in Russia, the Russian ambassador said there is no chance of nuclear warheads having been or being sold in the future to any country since all the nuclear weapons in the CIS are still under Moscow's full and exclusive control. The nuclear warheads have serial numbers, and the

stockpiles are occasionally checked and counted meticulously. Bovin made these remarks at a news conference in Beersheba, where he was the municipality's guest of honor. [end recording]

[Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew at 1630 GMT on 16 September reports that Bovin added that "the quantities of Soviet weapons currently reaching the Middle East are marginal and do not alter the balance of power in the region. He went on to say that Russia sells arms to the Arab countries for money, and not in exchange for Russia's political support for the Arabs."]

Syrian Nuclear Capability, Golan Security Eyed

TA1809172292 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT
(LESHABAT supplement) in Hebrew 18 Sep 92 p 4

[Commentary by Ron Ben-Yishay: "Security Calls For a Partial Withdrawal Only"]

[Text] From the security point of view, the Golan is not sacred. Yet as long as military threats (Syrian or other) from the east persist, our military presence in the area—at least in part of the Golan—is vital for the security of the whole of Israel.

Since the Golan was conquered in 1967, the Syrian Army's offensive capability has grown manifold. The Syrians have quite accurate surface-to-surface missiles, for which they have chemical warheads and which can reach every population center in Israel. Published data indicate that the Syrian Army alone has more tanks—more than 1,000 of them are modern T-72's—than all the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] armored divisions put together. Its artillery consists of hundreds of self-propelled guns; some of its surface-to-air missile batteries are mobile and can provide quite efficient air cover for an assault force.

Syria's domination of Lebanon and the numerous troops deployed there give the Syrian Army offensive maneuvering options against northern Israel that they have not possessed in the past. Once the United States eases its pressure on the Iraqis, Baghdad could send a couple of divisions to the Golan Heights within a few days. The Iranians, too, could enhance Syria's ability to strike at Israeli territory.

Hence, Israel's leaders can no longer be sure—as they were in the 1960's and 1970's—that in the event of a successful Syrian offensive they would be able to turn the tables through a no less successful counteroffensive.

Having said that, full peace with Syria, coupled with a full concession of the Golan, would significantly reduce the potential threat to Israel. Al-Asad continues to procure and manufacture modern weapons systems and train his army for an attack concurrently with the peace talks, however. This being the situation, Israel's leaders must work on the assumption that the threat persists and might materialize.

Therefore, even in the case of full peace with Syria, the IDF must be able to repel a ground offensive from the north and the east before the enemy descends from the Golan Heights or reaches Metulla. Moreover, Israel must be able to thwart a massive onslaught of surface-to-surface missiles and bombers on its population centers.

The IDF needs Mt. Hermon, the steep knolls on the Golan Heights, and the area to their west to fulfill both these missions. Except for this narrow strip, ranging in width from 7 to 10 km, all the rest can be ceded, at least from the military point of view.

Mt. Hermon and the knolls are necessary, mainly for early warning and intelligence. Even when an Israeli surveillance satellite orbits over the Middle East, it will focus on long-range threats and will not supplant the electronic intelligence installations on the Golan. These provide not only early warning, but up-to-date intelligence about the deployment of the enemy's ground forces in the area. This intelligence is also vital in order to thwart a possible strike at Israel's population centers.

On the face of it, there would seem to be alternatives for the intelligence installations. For example, if the Americans agree to give us espionage, control, and early-warning aircraft, such as the AWACS the Saudis have, or the new J-Star surveillance planes which were first used in the Gulf war, we could definitely contemplate giving up our electronic observation posts. Purchasing such aircraft and keeping them in the air 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, would cost billions of dollars which are sorely missing from our Treasury's coffers, however.

In addition to that, these heavy surveillance aircraft would be easy prey for the Syrian long-range SA-5 missiles. Moreover, the AWACS could not replace artillery and other lookout posts which would command firing and aim it at the tanks charging westward toward Israeli territory.

Even if the Americans foot the bill for our intelligence and early warning needs, Israel must still find a way to curb armored troops from advancing from the east. A full demilitarization of the Golan from tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and antiaircraft missiles could partially solve this problem. In that event, if the IDF realizes that the enemy is deploying against it in the east it could move toward the Golan Heights and seize vital areas.

As is known, the bulk of the IDF is made up of reserves units, however. These need more than a few hours to mobilize, get their act together, and start moving toward the Golan, particularly if the mobilization and equipment centers and the roads leading to the Golan are subject to a heavy barrage of missiles and aircraft. At that same time, the Syrian Army, which consists mostly of regular divisions, could advance and start gaining access to areas and roads leading to Israeli territory.

At that stage, only IDF helicopter gunships, jet fighters, and long-range weapons would be able to stop the masses of armored troops from advancing westward. Considering the force presently at its disposal, it is doubtful that the IDF could manage to complete this mission, however.

Consequently, even under conditions of absolute peace, a minimal armored force must be deployed on the Golan, behind deep antitank trenches and mine fields. Such a deployment need not resemble today's. To enable it to fulfill its mission, the IDF need only hold on to the outskirts of the Golan Heights, near the knolls area, and the riverbed of the al-Ruqqad in the south to prevent the tanks from moving toward Lake Tiberias.

As said, a total pullout from the Golan is out of the question until Syria's ability to attack us has undergone a radical change. One such change could be if Syria agrees to disarm half of its tanks, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, and combat engineering units as well as move its surface-to-surface missiles to northern Syria, to an area from which they cannot be fired at Israel, and agrees to a full demilitarization of the Golan and south Lebanon from all heavy weaponry.

If the Syrians accept this proposal and agree to international supervision over the implementation of the agreement, Israel, from the military point of view, could not agree not only to an absolute IDF pullout from the Golan Heights, but also to a concurrent demilitarization of the Hula Valley, the Jordan Valley, and the area east of Lake Tiberias, as al-Asad demands.

At the moment, the chances of al-Asad's agreeing to such a revolutionary deal are quite slim, however, and that is why Rabin cannot accept his demand to hand back the entire Golan to Syria.

Nevertheless, authoritative sources in Israel believe al-Asad will accept an agreement that upholds his honor. For example, he might agree to a continued Israeli presence on the Golan if Israel agrees to cede some territory now and to discuss additional concessions in the future. Hence, everything is still open.

Fourth Arrow Missile Trial Launch Planned 'Soon'

*TA2009104492 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
20 Sep 92 p A1*

[Report by security affairs correspondent Aluf Ben]

[Excerpt] The fourth trial launch of the Arrow missile—the results of which will be decisive for the future of the missile's development—will be held soon. In the test, a single missile will be fired from a ship off the Israeli shores.

The launch is supposed to examine the various systems of the missile and mainly to find out whether the

developers have managed to locate and correct the malfunctions that foiled the three previous launches.

Chief of Staff Ehud Barak said last week that the success of this launch, and perhaps also of the one to follow it, will determine the future of the project. Yitzhaq Rabin, prime minister and defense minister, who was in office when the project first started, has expressed his support for the continued development of the missile as another layer in the defense of the Israeli home front. [passage omitted]

PAKISTAN

Munir Khan Claims Nuclear Development 'Frozen'

*92WP0298A Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
21 Aug 92 p 1*

[News report by Munir Ahmad Khan: "Pakistan Has Frozen Its Nuclear Program at the 1989 Level"—first paragraph is NAWA-I-WAQT lead]

[Text] India Should do the Same; Nations of the World Want To Stop the Arms Race; 1 Billion Inhabitants of South Asia Should be Saved From the Fear of a Nuclear War; Basic Scientific Research for Peaceful Purposes Continues in Pakistan; The Meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Agency for Nuclear Progress To Be Held Next Month Will Consider the Proposal for a Five-Country Conference; NAWA-I-WAQT's Interview With the Former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Lahore (from Sikander Lodhi): Pakistan has suggested to India that it follow the example of Pakistan, which has frozen its atomic energy program at the 1989 level, and immediately freeze its program for nuclear progress so that South Asia could be declared a nuclear free zone. The board of governors of the International Agency for Nuclear Progress will discuss Pakistan's proposal in detail at its 21 September meeting. The board will also discuss again prime minister Nawaz Sharif's proposal for making South Asia a nuclear free zone. In an interview with NAWA-I-WAQT here on Thursday, Munir Ahmad Khan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, said that research was being carried out in Pakistan on a modern scientific basis under the Atoms for Peace Program, and that China had expressed willingness to supply a 300 megawatt nuclear power plant to Pakistan.

Speaking at a reception for engineers, Munir Khan stated that in January 1972, former president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto convened an important meeting of the senior heads of the Atomic Energy Commission in Multan where he unexpectedly announced the appointment of Munir Khan as chairman. Munir Khan said that he told Bhutto that he was not given any information prior to being entrusted with such a heavy responsibility, and Bhutto answered that Munir Khan did not need such information, and that important decisions were usually

made this way. Munir Khan said that he was chairman of the Nuclear Energy Commission from 1972 to 1991, and during his term of office, he had briefed six prime ministers and chief executives on Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program, and every one of the heads of state had emphasized the continuation of the peaceful nuclear energy program in the interests of the country's safety and prosperity.

IAEA Proposals on Nuclear Reactor Considered

*BK1809103592 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
18 Sep 92 pp 1, 4*

[By Aroosa Alam]

[Text] Islamabad, Sept 17—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has proposed application of unprecedented stringent safeguards on 300-MW nuclear power reactor being acquired by Pakistan from China.

The terms were finalised in a draft agreement approved by the Board of Governors of the Agency in its meeting held in Vienna in June 1992 which had now been communicated to Pakistan for consent.

Disclosing this, knowledgeable sources told THE MUSLIM that though some of the provisions of the agreement are discriminatory in nature, Pakistan would probably accept them. They said Pakistan's nuclear programme was directed entirely towards peaceful uses and its thrust was to meet the energy requirements of the country. Therefore, they said, Pakistan had nothing to be afraid of.

THE MUSLIM has gathered that the draft agreement has been vetted by the technical experts at Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and they have cleared it. The agreement has also got the approval of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Law and Justice.

The Prime Minister is also reported to have okayed it informally and it is now waiting for formal approval of the Federal Cabinet, after which this bilateral agreement will be signed between Pakistan and the IAEA.

The 300-MW pressurized light water nuclear power station is to be supplied by China under a bilateral cooperation agreement.

The sources said under the proposed agreement, Pakistan was required to undertake that none of the items including the reactor facilities of the said station, nuclear material supplied by China to Pakistan for use in this reactor facility, nuclear material and subsequent generations of special fissionable material and the items entered into an inventory list to be maintained by the IAEA, shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose. It will also have to undertake that these items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

The inventory to be maintained by the Agency will be divided into three parts. Its main part will include reactor facility, nuclear material supplied by China for use in this reactor and any nuclear material including subsequent generations of special fissionable material, produced, processed or used in or by the use of this reactor.

The second part to be called the 'subsidiary part' will list any facility while containing, using, processing or fabricating any nuclear material as mentioned in the main part.

The 'inactive part' of the inventory will list nuclear material and parts of the reactor facility which do not attract safeguards.

The agreement requires Pakistan to immediately notify the Agency of arrival in Pakistan of the reactor facility in question or nuclear material supplied by China for use in this facility.

Pakistan will also have to notify the IAEA, through reports, the nuclear and chemical composition, physical form and the quantity of the nuclear material, the type and capacity of the reactor facility, the date of shipment, the date of receipt, the identity of the consigner and the consignee and other relevant information.

Another important safeguard includes notification to the Agency of Pakistan's intention to transfer any item listed in the main part of the inventory to a facility within Pakistan but which is not yet listed in the inventory. In such an eventuality, Pakistan will have to provide necessary information to IAEA, so as to enable it to arrange to apply safeguards to the items after transfer to such a facility.

Pakistan shall also notify the Agency of any intended transfer of any item listed in the main part of the inventory to a recipient which is not under the jurisdiction of Pakistan. This will not apply to those items transferred to China which were originally supplied by China to Pakistan, however, or in case of spent fuel produced and transferred to China.

IAEA will be posting its inspectors at some 'critical' points to ensure that no diversion of the material or parts takes place. Pakistan will be responsible for physical protection of these inspectors.

The agreement provides that the safeguards being applied to this plant will be terminated if Pakistan at any stage signs the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].

The draft agreement also proposes a procedure for settling disputes arising out of the interpretation and application of the safeguards. In the first stage, both the parties will hold bilateral consultations to sort out the matter. If the matter still remains unresolved, it will be referred to an arbitral tribunal on the request of 'either party—Pakistan or the Agency'. Pakistan and IAEA shall designate arbitrators for the tribunal.

Chinese-Designed N-Plant Said Under Construction

*92WP0298B Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu
13 Aug 92 p 1*

[News report: "Spokesman: 'The Installation of a 300-Megawatt Chinese Nuclear Power Plant Has Started; There Are No Doubts or Suspensions Regarding the Agreement; Pakistan Will Not Sign Any Discriminatory or Unequal Pact'"]

[Excerpt] Islamabad (News Reporter): A foreign ministry spokesman said during a briefing here Wednesday that there were no doubts or suspicions regarding the agreement by China to supply a 300-megawatt [MW] nuclear power plant to Pakistan and that reports published in connection with this matter were false. The spokesman said that the agreement to supply the 300-MW power plant had been concluded and work on the installation of the plant had already started. He said that

Pakistan had conferred with the international nuclear agency in regard to the matter and that the plant would have the safety [approval?] of the Agency. He stated that Pakistan had always made it clear that it would never sign a discriminatory and unequal pact regarding the designation of South Asia as a nuclear free zone; the prime minister also had made it clear that Pakistan would not enter into any agreement regarding its peaceful nuclear program. The spokesman referred to a press report and said in explanation that the international agency for nuclear safety was not considering any proposal under which countries that had not signed the NPT (Nonproliferation Treaty) would be asked to open to inspection those nuclear installations that are not ordinarily open to such inspection. The spokesman stated that the board of governors of the international agency for nuclear safety would be meeting in Vienna next month and its agenda did not include any such proposal. [passage omitted]

Russia Refutes Swedish Claims on Submarines*LD2309091792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0845 GMT 23 Sep 92*

[BY ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Sep—The press service of the Russian Defense Ministry today refuted a report by the Swedish telegraph bureau (TT), which claims that submarines being chased by vessels of the national Navy in Swedish territorial waters belong to Russia. TT circulated this information on Tuesday, quoting Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt. The reports stresses that there are no direct indications as to the state identity of the submarines, however.

Nikolay Medvedev, deputy chief of the Russian Defence Ministry press service, told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that "Russian submarines deal with the problems of military training and military service outside the territorial waters of foreign states." Quoting the information from the headquarters of the Russian Navy, he underscored that Russian military vessels do not violate Swedish naval borders, and that submarines have not been sent to the region of the Baltic Sea indicated by the Swedish side.

Target of Missiles Remains Unchanged*LD2209223392 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 2155 GMT 22 Sep 92*

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Sep—The threat of a world nuclear missile war and large-scale military conflict have today been virtually reduced to a minimum, Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of the strategic missile forces, stated. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries an interview with him today.

At the same time, he said, one must not forget that the danger of war has not ceased to be a reality. "Consequently, the role of the strategic missile forces which possess the means for ensuring global stability remains the same as it was," he stressed. When asked by the newspaper's correspondent where the missiles were now targeted, Igor Sergeyev stated that "the question of selection of targets is a matter for big time politics. It is obvious that the retargeting of missiles cannot be a unilateral act if we are speaking about collective security."

When asked by the correspondent whether there have been any instances of the theft of nuclear munitions in the strategic missile forces, Igor Sergeyev gave assurances that there have been no such instances and said they "could not be called anything other than provocations."

Ukraine Parliament To Join Vienna Convention*LD1709115192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1034 GMT 17 Sep 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Viktor Demidenko for TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 17 Sep—A decision was adopted today at the session of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet on Ukraine joining the Vienna Convention on the legal succession of states with regard to treaties. It was stressed at the sitting of parliament that the adoption of the document has been brought about by the fact that the present convention regulates a complex of problems concerning the practical implementation of norms and rules on legal succession in that sphere of international relations during the break-up and the appearance of new independent states.

The Convention contains the essential international and legal bases for the introduction of a sovereign Ukraine.

Belarus Defense Minister on Nuclear-Free Status*LD1909203692 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0800 GMT 17 Sep 92*

[Text] Belarus Defense Minister Pavel Kozlovskiy told a correspondent of IZVESTIYA newspaper that achieving the status of a nuclear-free power was planned for the final stage of the republic's armed forces, in about seven years' time. By that time, he said, withdrawal of strategic nuclear forces from the territory of Belarus will have been completed.

The Belarus minister of defense also pointed out that the bilateral military agreement between Russia and Belarus should not be regarded as a military alliance. The document defined the status of the temporary stay of Russian troops in Belarus, Pavel Kozlovskiy stressed.

Belarus Parliament on Selling Missile Components*OW2109184392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1645 GMT 21 Sep 92*

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Asked by IF [INTERFAX] to comment on Russia's exports of the components of the eliminated nuclear missiles, chairman of the Belarusian parliament Stanislav Shushkevich said the following:

"I would not like anyone to view this as a political problem. This is a purely economic issue which can be settled in accordance with established procedure." Shushkevich reminded journalists that he was a physicist by profession and expressed his view on the possibility of

using nuclear materials removed from the strategic missiles to be eliminated. "To remove these materials for subsequent utilization would be tantamount to removing raisins from pies," he remarked.

IF Note: In the preliminary estimate of Belarusian experts, the nuclear stuffing of the strategic missiles to be removed from Belarus costs several billion dollars. The documents setting forth the terms for the removal of the strategic nuclear weapons, signed by Belarus, do not envisage the possibility of selling their components.

Tomorrow, the Presidential Bulletin will give details of the press conference given by Stanislav Shushkevich.

Kazakhstan Data on Uranium Reserves Declassified

MK1609093192 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Sep 92 p 3

[NEGA column report: "Kazakhstan"]

[Text] The Government of Kazakhstan has decided to declassify information on reserves and the geological-economic characteristics of the republic's uranium deposits.

It has also been decided to release for press publication and submission to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], the London Uranium Institute, and other international organizations information on total uranium reserves and resources. This action will enable Kazakhstan to meet the condition governing admission to IAEA membership and to obtain a uranium sales quota.

Georgia Developing Arms Production Capability

OW1409162192 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1559 GMT 14 Sep 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] INTERFAX learned from well-informed sources that in the Abkhazian city of Tkvarcheli enterprises are developing weapons production. There are not enough weapons in Abkhazian partisan detachments operating in the Ochamchira region.

They plan to issue weapons at the enterprises which worked in the defense industry during World War II. Specialists who worked at these enterprises during the war will assist the development of weapons production.

Azerbaijan Accuses Armenia of Using CW

OW1609134292 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1319 GMT 16 Sep 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan asserts that the villages of the Tauz region of Azerbaijan were fired by shells with poison gas.

The Ministry's press center reports that according to the results of a preliminary analysis, the 122-mm artillery shells filled with needles which were fired against the villages contained a substance of orange color. Several cases have been registered when people died in some minutes if a splinter of a shell reached them.

Earlier Azerbaijan already accused Armenia of using poisoning gases but international experts did not reconfirmed this fact.

Azerbaijan Villages Report Use of 'Toxic Agents'

OW1709153392 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1450 GMT 17 Sep 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the preliminary information, six persons were killed, among them four children, and at least 12 were wounded during the shelling of Karabakh's regional center of Askeran September 16. The Karabakh news agency reports that the shelling of Askeran and neighbouring villages continued last night and today's morning. One of the Mi-24 helicopters shelling the regional center was shot down.

According to a report from Yerevan, a number of Armenian villages bordering on Nakhichevan were attacked last night. One person was wounded.

According to the Azeri Defense Ministry, there was long-lasting positional fighting in the Mardakertskiy region of Karabakh and the shelling of Azerbaijan's regional center of Agdam bordering on Karabakh. The Azeri Defense Ministry has confirmed that shells with toxic agents were used there.

Tajik Uranium Sales to Iran Alleged

924P0175A St. Petersburg CHAS PIK in Russian No 31, 3 Aug 92, No 32, 10 Aug 92

[Article in two installments by Lev Korsunskiy: "Is an Underground GULAG Operating? Tajik Uranium-238 May Be Serving as the Basis for the Development of an Islamic Bomb"]

[3 Aug 92 p 3]

[Text] A few words about myself. In 1949 the first atomic bomb was made in the USSR, and in that same year I was enrolled at the recently opened Central Asian Polytechnic, which had been opened in accordance with an order signed personally by Lavrentiy Beriia. It was in Tajikistan, 12 kilometers from the oblast center of Leninabad (now Khudzhand). We are old-timers from the socialist planned city that on the map of the republic was listed as Chkalovsk. Even at that time, Voice of America used to call it Atomabad. There were three conspicuous "points"

at that time in the socialist planned city: a gigantic prison camp, set behind two rows of barbed wire; a hospital; and our tekhnikum, whose first director was People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs [NKVD] Major Nikolay Mitrofanov.

A year later the prisoners built a house of culture opposite the tekhnikum. Lavrentiy Pavlovich came for the laying of the foundation stone, setting under the first brick a brand-new 20-ruble piece, which was given to him on a steel tray that had been polished until it sparkled. We students stood surrounded by the socialist planned city's militia, and along with everyone else, I obsequiously feasted my eyes on one of the god-leaders who so often stood on the Mausoleum along with Comrade Stalin. And at that instant only two of his personal bodyguards separated me from him...

They were training us to be geologists and surveyors, miners, analytical chemists, and technicians, to find, process, and enrich uranium ore, which at that time was being recovered in a radius of 100 kilometers from the socialist planned city, at the Tabosharskiy and Adrasman-skiy mines. We sixteen-year-old lads were taught by professors and even one academician whose full names we never managed to learn. Only one of them—Professor Nikiforov—once said that he had been brought to us from Mordova...

I graduated from the tekhnikum (my first graduation!) in 1952. But I did not work at my specialty—analytical chemistry—and after five exhaustive interviews in the special section, I was sent to a dosimetry course in the Moscow area. Kurchatov himself supervised the examinations (I learned the name of the academician 20 years later, when I saw a photograph of him in PRAVDA).

Six years later, like an experimental guinea pig with dosimeter at the ready, I was launched into command. I had to pay repeated visits to plant workshops, the galleries and drifts of the uranium mines, and dumps at enriching plants of the firstborn of the Soviet uranium industry—Combine No. 6 of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. And if, instead of a chronometric clicking, the dosimeter started to chirp, one gesture of my hand was enough for the chiefs to turn back without a murmur, and not to go to the workings and shops, where under the supervision of the guards the political prisoners and former inmates of fascist concentration camps labored—Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Soviet German Volksdeutsch, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks...

It was certainly for this reason that I was included in the nine top officials at the combine, those with the green passes that allowed them to visit all objects without exception. Such close access to the State Secret has for a long time sounded as a muffled Chekist echo in my fate as a journalist. I was not permitted abroad for 11 years, and then they graciously gave the okay for me to visit fraternal Bulgaria, where I was "tended" not only by the driver, Vasya, who had joined the group in Moscow and who

always had a pair of binoculars in his hands on the beach, but also by his Bulgarian colleagues.

What I am trying to write is not some story of a journalist who was lucky enough to meet and talk with a person who knows all about the origin of the firstborn of the Soviet uranium industry, whose output already by 1955 had enabled the country to start series production of atomic bombs that were put into service with the Air Force. Neither is it an excursion into the past (40 years back), into the terrible and at that time incomprehensible drama in which I and my comrades at the tekhnikum, taking into account the total lack of radiation protection at that time, were readied for the role of experimental rabbits along the road to nuclear power in the furnace of the Moloch of war, into which not just money, but people, were thrown regardless of the cost.

Two events prompted me to write this story: the great thinning of the column of the veterans of the atomic test special subunits as compared to last year as it marched along Nevskiy on 9 May along with the veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and a telephone call from a colleague in Hamburg: "Lev, take a look at issue No. 6 of STERN, at the article by Erich Follat. It is about Tajikistan, where you have said you grew up and studied."

This is why I hitched rides on three cars to Chkalovsk, where I lived for 11 years at one time. It was only when I started to conduct the investigation that I learned that my two daughters' first kindergarten, and the home of the junior specialists on Patrice Lumumba Street, where they were born, had been built on the camp cemetery, where the prisoners had been buried in secret in communal graves...

The Atomabad of General Chirkov

NKVD General Boris Nikolayevich Chirkov became well known in Chekist circles at the time when the country was gripped in the lethal gauntlet of Yezhov's people's commissariat, fighting the "enemies of the people." This well-built, intelligent-looking deputy chief of the NKVD in Kazakhstan achieved what were record results for that time: The most recalcitrant "enemies of the people" confessed to the most terrible kinds of crimes after only two minutes, three at the maximum, in his office. No, the deputy people's commissar did not beat the prisoners, did not hold them in punishment cells, did not blind them with powerful lights. If he allowed himself just one "liberty" it was that he loved to extinguish his Belomor cigarettes in the prisoners' nostrils. In order to make a prisoner confess Boris Chirkov needed just an ordinary stool and two stout assistants. The prisoner was placed on the stool on his back and a Chekist sat, one on his legs and one on his head; no one was able to withstand the pain of his lower back being broken.

General Chirkov's luck ran out after the 20th CPSU Congress. Two rehabilitated political prisoners who had miraculously survived wanted to know from the CPSU Central Committee if their torturer was still alive. It turned out that he was not only alive, but prospering: He

had become a Hero of Socialist Labor, and a lieutenant general, chief of a mighty combine that produced uranium. Nikita Sergeyevich [Khrushchev] remembered Chirkov's close friendship with Beriia and was merciless: The organizer of the firstborn of the Soviet atomic industry was expelled from the CPSU and demoted from his rank of general.

But when Atomabad, progeny of the GULAG, was flourishing, General Chirkov wore three hats: The concentration camps, the Chekists, and all the plants, which at that time held the monopoly in producing the raw materials for the Soviet atomic bomb, were subordinate to him. Second in importance in this atomic GULAG hierarchy was the chief of the Taboshar mining administration, Zarap Petrosovich Zarapetyan. He was also a Hero of Socialist Labor who later distinguished himself in the construction of the atomic city of Navoi in Bukhara Oblast, designed by architects in Leningrad. But at that time Zarap Petrosovich was valued not so much for his good temper or boundless energy but rather for the fact that he had become People's Commissar Beriia's brother-in-law—their wives were sisters. Whenever he accompanied the generals, their descent in the cage to any level of the mine was preceded by a ritual: The commandant of the mine would fire two shots whose echoes howled down into the depths, warning the overseers to exercise redoubled vigilance, and the underground workers that only shock labor could make them free.

Back in the early 1930's radium and strontium were mined at Taboshar for the laboratories in Moscow, which at that time were not secret at all. The first uranium mine at Taboshar was developed a year after the end of the war, and then the main plant, which was led by Andrey Levistkisy, was opened in the socialist planned city. It was to that place that political prisoners from the northern camps were transferred, mainly engineers and power engineers, construction workers and technologists. Then the concentration camp was expanded and augmented with the "PFL's"—the prisoners from the checking-and-screening camps. The main PFL contingent was made up of Soviet prisoners of war from fascist concentration camps and civilians taken into slavery in Germany, and the Volksdeutsch.

Behind the barbed wire there was a dual authority. The GULAG authorities were responsible for the production of uranium, while the political counterintelligence was constantly screening the prisoners, interrogating them for days at a time. The military tribunal worked every day: After 1947 no sentence of less than 25 years was passed. Particularly for the "Vlasov people," even though only one or two in each 10 condemned had at that time even heard of General Vlasov and the Russian Army of Liberation. A year later defectors appeared in the underground GULAG whom the allies, when they liberated them from the concentration camps, had sent back to their motherland. Crimean Tatars and Kalmyks assigned there for permanent settlement also worked in the development of the mines.

I particularly remember the Kalmyks. It was from them that I first learned what an "Italian [sit-in] strike" was. Outraged that the special commander had not settled them all together but had dispersed them among the barracks at opposite ends of the mine at Taboshar, for a week they were punctually driven each morning to the mine by the overseers, and there they served their time, in all their gear, but did not fill a single wagon with ore.

And I understood for all time that nostalgia is a deadly disease. How many Kalmyks, not sick at all, were carried away in the night in the "black wagons," not for interrogation but to the cemetery: In a week or two these sons of the steppe had pined away and uncomplainingly commended their souls to God, since they no longer had any hope in this life of seeing the boundless expanses of the yellow Kalmyk valley, or of hearing the clatter of the hooves or the neighing of the herds of horses. For this long-suffering people, the spotless white filly given by three elders to Adolf Hitler for his triumphant entry into Moscow became thousands of corpses of its sons and daughters. I heard about this only from the Chekists, and I cannot vouch for its authenticity.

The camps started to close after the death of the father of all the peoples, but the plants at Chkalovsk and Taboshar continued to enrich uranium ore. Then it was sent in containers to military plants in the Urals and Siberia. The number of deaths for each nuclear weapon, both in the recovery of the raw materials and its processing, was hardly an item posted in the dreadful accounts books of the atomic GULAG. But before revealing the secret, bloody tragedy hidden by the years, let us satisfy our curiosity a little...

What STERN Managed To Learn

Let me tell you briefly about the reportage from Erich Follat carried in issue No. 6 of the journal this year. After deciding to check on the truth of the rumors that Dushanbe is planning to sell enriched uranium to Iraq and Iran, the German reporter, representing himself as a business person connected with the international atomic industry, and having obtained in Moscow the address of a Dushanbe tea house and a countersign—"Can you help me?"—flew off to the capital of Tajikistan. In the tea house he was approached by a man who spoke the watchword and invited him to go with him. His contact, opening the conversation and speaking in beautiful English, offered to sell Erich Follat uranium, 80-percent enriched. The weight—15 kilograms, enough for one atomic bomb. The price? Ten thousand dollars for a trial package. To check the quality. The raw material was from Taboshar. Agreement was reached. They agreed to meet the next day at the same place...

[10 Aug 92 p 3]

[Text] Erich Follat went for his meeting as agreed 24 hours earlier with his contact. No one. But some "surprises" were waiting for Follat at the Tajikistan Hotel:

Not only his clothes and food had been stolen, but also archive material, down to the last sheet.

Follat decided to learn from the Tajik foreign minister Lakim Kayumov whether this was an ordinary robbery or a "prank" by the local state security.

I must quote directly from the material of my German colleague, because back in the 1960's I often met with the secretary of the Leninabad Komsomol oblast committee L. Kayumov, because I was working on the oblast newspaper, LENINABADSKAYA PRAVDA, covering Komsomol life.

So this is what Erich writes: "Like all the Government of Tajikistan (which existed until April 1992—author's note) led by President Rakhmon Nabiyev, Kayumov belongs to the concrete-headed clique of the old Communists who still rule here and who maintain excellent relations with the most reactionary circles of the military in Moscow." Kayumov, whose affiliation with the clan of the erstwhile Tajik Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Uldzhabayev was his main achievement, disappeared from view immediately following the unmasking of the cotton scam. In his usual elegant manner Nikita Khrushchev threatened the Kirgiz and the Turkmens that he would lift up their coattails to do the work that the Cossacks atamans now do with such relish, and deal even more harshly with the Tajik leaders—and more than 500 people were imprisoned and the composition of the Central Committee completely changed.

Kayumov surfaced again five years later, when he was appointed as an embassy worker in one of the countries of the Near East. R. Nabiyev, elected as Central Committee first secretary, rescued him from abroad and appointed him chief of the international section, and later, when he had become president of Tajikistan, renamed Kayumov as foreign minister. After the April events in Dushanbe, Lakim Kayumov went into hiding. I think that he is in his own Leninabad Oblast and is playing what is not the least significant role in the opposition to the government of national conciliation...

So, Kayumov assured the German journalist that he was not about to sell enriched uranium or nuclear technology to anyone. After he had described to his Dushanbe colleagues "his own" uranium deal, he heard in response that it could be, first, a provocateur, and second, a man from the secret service, or even a nuclear scientist working at his own risk. This is why STERN was unable to find out whether or not Tajikistan is selling enriched uranium to Iraq and Iran.

And I think that today, when the powerful flow of the world's cheapest oil, from Russia, has dried up, and not only for Tajikistan, a republic in which a monoculture agriculture dominates—cotton—and 93 percent of the territory is taken up by mountains, only highly enriched uranium can earn hard currency. And it can be obtained from the old addresses at Chkalovsk and Taboshar, those same places that still have a top-secret regime. And the

plants of the Eastern Rare Metals Combines, where even today the orders still arrive from Moscow on letterhead forms from... the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power, even though we are assured that the indestructible Union of free republics does not exist.

Chernobyl—the 20th Century Apocalypse—Started Long Before the Reactor Blew Up

If we recall the secrecy, strange as it may be, there was some humor in it. Black humor. Work at the Central Scientific Research Laboratory [TsNIL] started every day with my receiving a leatherette documents case imprinted with my own personal seal. The chief of the special section, Nikolay Ivanovich Seleznev, would not take me seriously, and he tried in every way he could to prove to the chiefs that an access pass for a 19-year-old lad was a fatal mistake for them. This is why when the documents case was passed through the narrow window of the special section, the same scene was played every evening: We had to count to make sure that all the documents were present. And if they were, did they match the inventory of pages? Why was the seal on the plasticine that secured the twine greasy? And when I was working, since all the copies of the keys for all the laboratories were kept in the special section, Nikolay Ivanovich would appear at my shoulder like the ghost of Hamlet's father: Is the documents case in the right place? Do not let colleagues nearby look at the documents; and so on and so forth.

Then I thought up a "terrible" revenge: In the recently published book "General Chemistry," by N. Glinka, whose tables were used for analytical calculations, Mendeleev's periodic table of elements was printed on the last page. In the box numbered 92, as usual, was the symbol for the rare element uranium. After the next attack of fault-finding, in a fit of anger I threw this at the "special section":

"Why are you always investigating me, Nikolay Ivanovich? You would do better to investigate why the chemists have on their desks a book in which our metal has been declassified!"

By morning all copies of "General Chemistry" were in the special section. Each book was numbered, laced up, and secured with a wax seal. An urgent report was sent to the chiefs of the combine administration by the special section, in which Seleznev reported on the action taken by foreign intelligence services to discover the country's chief secret. It was not only we in TsNIL who smiled...

After being called on the carpet, Seleznev stopped displaying such vigilance toward me, but his life ended terribly two years later and he went to the kingdom of heaven: He missed a secret document in a documents case, and he was hanged.

The whole world knows about the illness of the Joliot-Curie couple whose work with uranium and radium ended for them in cancer of the lungs. But is the country aware of those thousands of people who, without any

kind of protection, recovered the uranium, from those who did the "dry drilling" of the granodiorite (the ore containing the uranium) to those who worked at the enriching factories, who died three, five, eight, 10 years later? And how many died not only from silicosis but also from "miner's lung," resulting from the effects of radon—the colorless, odorless, and tasteless radioactive gas?

The first blow fell on the Volksdeutsch drilling the granodiorite in the mines at Adrasmana: The combination of the finely dispersed particles produced in "dry" drilling without lubrication, and the radon that filled the mine workings led to death after two or three years. When the count of repressed Volga Germans who had died from silicosis topped a thousand and the autopsies continued to show that the miners' lungs were eaten away with dust and the pituitary and the adrenal cortex were deformed, even Academician Aleksandrov himself grew concerned and initiated work to find some means of protection.

In Chkalovsk even my old tried and true friends were motivated by commercial secrecy to refuse to answer the question of how much of the black oxides of uranium-238 the combine produces. But to judge from the fact that since my time the stocks of the finished product have quadrupled, while the technology for uranium enrichment has not stood still, the volume of output has risen many times over. If we take into account the fact that the plant is producing as a "consumer product" vanadium pentoxide for aircraft construction and tungsten trioxide for high-strength tools, then Tajikistan's earnings from output produced at the Vostokredmet Association could be billions. If, of course, this concern, which even today is supplied from all the CIS republics—ores are brought in from Bukhara and Kzyl-Orda, sulfur from Navoi, soda from Mangyshlak, ion-exchange resins from Kharkov, and everything else from Russia—becomes the national property of Tajikistan. There can be no doubt that experts will arrive from Afghanistan and Iran and other Muslim countries and will not be averse to studying the work experience gained at the Chkalovsk and Taboshar plants. Or, in an extreme case, put in an order for its output.

As far as Iran is concerned, in the 13 years that have elapsed since the Islamic revolution, Teheran has already really started to create a bloc of Muslim states under its aegis, rather than the Arabs'. As the French newspaper QUOTIDIENNE DE PARIS reports, in July of last year the commander of the Iranian Air Force, General Masud Sattari, conducted successful negotiations in Moscow to purchase 48 MiG-29's, 24 Su-24's, and the same number of MiG-31's, along with Tupolev supersonic bombers.

The MiG-27 FLOGGER D/J modified to carry and launch tactical nuclear weapons did not figure on that list. But Iran did recently acquire it. So that the rumors about an Islamic atomic bomb mesh with this purchase. The more so since in the Arab countries, alarmed about

Iran's nuclear aspirations, they never tire of repeating that it has a "kanbalakh dkhariekh," which in translation is "nuclear bomb."

We might add to this the noteworthy fact that experts from the Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Research in Moscow were offered a salary of \$30,000 a year plus bonuses if they would agree to go to Iran to train specialists.

At a time when Tajikistan is on the threshold of civil war and the first carefully hidden casualties of it are no longer being counted in dozens, near Khudzhand a powerful atomic concern is operating, the firstborn of the underground atomic GULAG.

Who will protect it from nationalization by Tajikistan?

For whom will it be working in a year or two?

Kyrgyzstan Quake Blamed on Chinese N-Blast

*PM1409151592 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Sep 92 p 4*

[Report by Zaur Kadymbekov under the "Hypotheses" rubric: "Secret of Nature's Indignation"]

[Text] Baku—A destructive earthquake in Kyrgyzstan might have been caused by a nuclear explosion carried out in China in May this year.

This was the conclusion reached by a leading specialist in the sphere of earthquakes triggered by nuclear explosions—Professor Ikram Kerimov, deputy director of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences Institute of Geology.

Declassification of hitherto secret work has shown that the opinion expressed by the Azerbaijani scientist should be treated in all seriousness. Back in 1978 he was the first to determine a link between the destructive earthquake in Gazli and the nuclear tests on the Semipalatinsk site, and he advanced a supposition about the possibility of powerful new shocks in the next few years. A repeat earthquake in Gazli in 1984 confirmed that the scientist was right.

I. Kerimov subsequently revealed a natural law governing a change in seismic murmurs before an earthquake, which was registered as a scientific discovery.

Kerimov said in conversation that the impact of technology on nature is now becoming so serious and is threatening the safety of mankind, that all activity in this area must be placed under strict international control.

Film Depicts Secret Nuclear Town: Chelyabinsk-70

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[Editorial Report] Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian at 1922 GMT on 9 September, in its "Black Box" program, carries a 40-minute recorded feature called

"The Closed City" [peredacha vtoraya], second in its series "The Secret of Nuclear Weapons." Reception is good.

The program begins with an unidentified correspondent introducing clips from a film produced by Mikhail Romm, "Nine Days of One Year," about a nuclear physicist involved in secret work on a nuclear accelerator to achieve thermonuclear synthesis and who ended up in a clinic following repeated doses of radiation.

The fate of such scientists was only revealed in May 1992, when a television crew was permitted to go to a secret nuclear town in the Urals, which was long hidden, even from the CIA.

The crew was allotted nine days to make their film about the closed town. On day one, the TV crew flew to a town which is not designated on any Soviet map. Film of the town is accompanied by some rhetorical questions as to what the town is like and whether Russian nuclear physicists will start to go abroad.

In the hotel, the TV crew heard people speaking about a strange "green release" into the atmosphere in one of the squares on the outskirts of the town. Their escort denied knowledge of any such releases.

Academician Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Avrorin, head of the institute in the town, states that the town was set up to create an atomic bomb. A few details of Avrorin's career are given and how he came to work at the secret nuclear center on the shores of Lake Sinara, near Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk. The town was like a back-up center in case the major center, Arzamas-16, should need replacement.

Avrorin speaks about the restrictions imposed on the town's residents, such as the need for permission to invite people to the town, to go abroad, telephone calls being tapped, and mail being checked, which he explains as the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the leaking of state secrets. Nuclear missiles abroad are targeted on this town, and therefore its residents are live targets.

Chelyabinsk-70 or Snezhinsk are the names of the town. The configuration of a snowflake, the town's symbol, is reminiscent of an explosion in its outlines, the correspondent says. The film shows various residential districts of the town.

Avrorin says that people's moods have changed as they realized that they have been responsible for something detrimental to mankind, rather than something important and needed.

V.P. Laushkin, a senior research assistant and candidate of Technical Sciences, and V.M. Ivanov, a leading designer, who composed the town's own anthem, are introduced to the TV crew.

Avrorin gives details of how people were selected for work in this town. There were even many non-party people.

Avrorin is interviewed by the TV crew in Moscow before going on a business trip to the United States. Avrorin says that he can now name his institute, address, and telephone number, although for many years he was bound by secrecy. He says that the type of secrecy varies in Russia and the United States. Avrorin's institute is called the All-Russia Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics. The video features the meeting of scientists in America.

The institute is said to be responsible for the "green release," which the TV crew manages to film. Video shows a townscape with a misty green outline around the buildings and other objects.

On day two, the TV crew, who do not yet have full permission for their filming, are permitted to film the checkpoint at the entrance to the town, which is surrounded with barbed wire and a ploughed strip and guarded by soldiers with machine guns. Filming of soldiers was restricted, and then prohibited completely.

The unidentified correspondent says: "They took us to Lake (Sumgul). Here there was forbidden zone B, at the end of the forties. Our candidates and doctors of sciences, from among prisoners, of course, together with German scientists who had been taken prisoner, under the leadership of the convicted academician Timofeyev-Resovskiy, carried out top-secret research on the effect of radiation on live organisms. After all, practically nothing was known of that secret phenomenon then. A dangerous background of radiation has persisted up until our days. One finds dirty spots of contamination in places on the soil." The video shows the lake.

In spite of the contamination, the Orlenok pioneer camp for the children from the town is located on the shores of the lake. A howitzer at the camp is shown, which was once at the epicenter of a nuclear explosion. Video shows the pioneer camp.

The town's main sociologist, V.N. Osipov, candidate of Economic Sciences, recounts that the town was created over night in 1956 and speaks about the demographic situation in the town.

Kirill Ivanovich Shelkin was the first head of the institute, followed by (Sbabakin) in the 60s, and by academician Avrorin in the 80s. In the next five years, the original scientists, who are in their fifties and make up the town's main potential, will retire. Avrorin speaks about the very small inflow of young specialists to the town, less than 3 percent of new staff are being taken on each year. But the young people in the closed town desire freedom.

A young unidentified man from the town shows the TV crew his cartoons, indicating how the people in the town are like prisoners, bound and gagged, and shows a

cartoon of a multi-limbed man with "I will not forget the 1957 explosion" tattooed on his chest.

Academician Avrorin speaks about the danger of a brain drain, about the possibility that people will go and work in the West. In some branches of the Academy of Sciences, almost half of the staff are already working abroad, he says.

On day three of the TV crew's visit to the town, sirens sound while the crew is visiting the town, but people in the streets take no notice. The siren was evidently sounding from the secret production facility.

The "secret production facility" will be dealt with in the next "Black Box" program of Black Box, the correspondent announces. The date and time of the next segment are not announced.

ITALY

'Mysterious' Illegal Uranium Seized in Rimini

92WN0758A Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian
27 Aug 92 p 16

[Article by Luciano Pedrelli: "Stop! That Capsule Is Full of Uranium"]

[Text] *In Rimini, two persons arrested with 20 grams of isotope 235. It is a sufficient quantity for laboratory experiments on atomic devices. A spy story with international overtones.*

Rimini—"Don't open it, or it will be the end for everyone." When the curious Carabinieri began to study a very small lead capsule, panic appeared on the face of Luigi Baratiri, 26, businessman of Giulianova Marche. There was a shout: "Stop!" Then came the terrifying revelation: "It contains uranium."

The capsule holds back the murderous charge of 20 grams of "Isotope 235," almost certainly "enriched" (this can only be confirmed by tests ordered by the magistrate). They are small amounts with which certainly one could not build a power station. However, they can be used in laboratories to test arms and atomic weapons. In a single blow, someone with a murderous mind could poison all Rome's inhabitants through the water supply. Fortunately, this will not happen. However, from Rimini an intricate case exploded in which nuclear traffic was presented like a spy story connected with shady international affairs.

The mystery story revolves around Luigi Baratiri, son of Danubio, former president of the Giulianova soccer team and, until 1980, the former representative in Libya for a Milan producer of hydraulic pumps. Both own ITAF [expansion unknown]-Italafricana, an import-export firm that trades with Libya, Romania, and other nations throughout the world. Baratiri, with no police record, was arrested Tuesday evening at the Club House. It is the beach hotel of Rimini in which he stopped a few days ago, together with his partner Daniele Colli, 31, of Giulianova. He, too, landed in jail. Their guilt was established by the search of a suitcase carrying Arab insignias and the logo of Libyan Airlines. They found a tin can, in which the capsule was placed, and shouts were heard to avoid opening it. It seems that a message was sent from Rome to intercept the pair. It still seems that a mysterious "third man" escaped capture. He was the unknown emissary, perhaps called to negotiate for the uranium sample.

Colli proclaimed his "innocence" almost as though he had happened to get involved in a dangerous game that overwhelmed him. But, after the first questions at the police station, the young businessman unveiled a disconcerting identity: "I am an undercover agent for SISMI (ed. note: [Italian] Military Intelligence Service)." The investigators were embarrassed and stunned. The scene had suddenly changed. There appeared to be the outlines, still to be defined, of a kind of uranium connection on routes between East Europe and the Middle East. There are many obscure points: Where did the valuable and terrible cargo come from? To whom was it directed? What was the role and identity (Italian or foreign?) of the "third man" who escaped the Carabinieri stakeout through a series of coincidences?

Police barracks and other places for possible meetings are crowded with high-level officers and counter-espionage personnel. Maximum secrecy is being observed. There is an investigation at Teramo on the activities of ITAF. Assistant Prosecutor Roberto Sapio ordered tests to be made on the capsule. Meanwhile, the magistrate in charge of preliminary investigations, Andreucci, decides to hold interrogations tomorrow. The charges are: "Contraband and smuggling into Italy of uranium for military purposes."

For the moment, the only thing that emerges on Baratiri's activities are the latest sale orders: a load of polyvinyl for handbags that arrived from Libya and food products. It is clear that the key to the mystery remains the statement, "I am an undercover agent of SISMI." If that were true, a new hypothesis would enter the investigation. Perhaps Baratiri was in Rimini on an official "mission," and his task was to contact an intermediary of who knows what organization (national or international?), that is, the real man to be arrested and the true band to be captured.

In brief, did the young businessman move from being a maker of traps to being entrapped himself? Judging by his defense, the answer is yes.

Now, possible connections are being sought between that uranium-connection and the traffic in suitcases full of rubles and gold from Russia, carried by hundreds of intermediaries, spreading throughout Europe through the crossroads of Switzerland. This brings to the forefront an episode at Rimini on 15 November last. At that time, within the framework of an operation throughout Italy, 15 persons were arrested precisely on the charge of clandestine traffic in rubles.

According to investigations, the gang counted on recycling at least 100 billion in Soviet currency which was to have been transferred via the Romagna coast.

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